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THE VIRTUE OF LIBERALITY IN AMERICAN 
COMMUNAL LIFE 
Linda R. Hirshman * 
The last straw for me was television producer Aaron Spelling's 600 
square feet of closet space. 1 But the straw was really only a straw in 
the wind, a wind that has for some years carried signs of dissatisfac-
tion with the extreme individualism of American life and law.2 In 
* Professor of Law and Norman & Edna Freehling Scholar, Illinois Institute of Technology, 
Chicago-Kent College of Law. B.A. 1966, Cornell University; J.D. 1969, University of Chicago. 
The Marshall Ewell Fund and Diana CoJlins provided research support. Thanks to Constance 
Abrams, Randy Barnett, Ronald Collins, Steven Heyman, Gordon Hylton, Kenneth Karst, Ken-
neth Kress, H. Jefferson Powell, Carol Rose, Suzanna Sherry, and David Skover for their help 
("Now those who wish well to their friends for their sake are most truly friends; for they do this 
by reason of their own nature •... " ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS VIII.3,.at 196 (Ross 
trans. 1925) (World's Classics Paperback ed.)). 
1. Stein, The House of Spelling: Massive Construction Project in Holmby Hills Flusters Some 
Neighbors, L.A. Times, Apr. 8, 1988, § 5, at 1, col. 1 (home ed.) (Aaron Spelling has built an 
addition onto his home "to allow [room for] two clothes closet areas and adjacent balconies, 
approximately 28 feet and 42 feet in length and both approximately 8 feet in width."). 
2. First life and then law, of course. Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 
65 TEXAS L. REV. 873, 875-83 (1987). The impulse originally sprang almost simultaneously 
from philosophy, sociology, and history. In philosophy: See generally R. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND 
0BJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS AND PRAXIS (1983); A. 
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1981); M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 
(1982); M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983); 
Taylor, Hegel: History and Politics, in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 177 (M. Sandel ed. 1984). 
In sociology: See generally B. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS 
FOR A NEW AGE (1984); R. BELLAH, R. MADSEN, W. SULLIVAN, A. SWIDLER & S. TIPTON, 
HABITS OF THE HEART (1985) [hereinafter HABITS OF THE HEART]; M. JANOWITZ, THE RE-
CONSTRUCTIONS OF PATRIOTISM: EDUCATION FOR CIVIC CONSCIOUSNESS (1983); Barber, The 
Compromised Republic: Public Purposelessness in America, in THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 19 (R. Horwitz ed. 1977). 
In history: See generally J. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT (1975); G. WOOD, 
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1969); Pocock, Virtues, Rights and 
Manners: A Mode/for Historians of Political Thought, 9 POL. THEORY 353 (1981). 
Legal scholars followed, and the connections to other disciplines and to each other are, as 
always, ambiguous and oblique, e.g., H. BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE: A THEORY OF 
POETRY (1973), but any canon of civic republican jurisprudence must include: G. STONE, L. 
SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1986); M. TUSHNET, RED, 
WHITE AND BLUE (1988); Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 
YALE L.J. 1013 (1984); Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Michelman, 
Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Property, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1319 (1987) 
[hereinafter Michelman, Possession]; Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term - Foreword: 
Traces of Self Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 3 (1986) [hereinafter Michelman, Traces of Self 
Government]; Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong with Rationality Review?, 
13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 487 (1979); Sherry, An Essay Concerning Toleration, 71 MINN. L. REV. 
963 (1987); Sherry, The Founder's Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127 (1987); 
Stewart, Regulation in a Liberal State: The Role of Non-Commodity Values, 92 YALE L.J. 1537 
(1983); Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988); Sunstein, Standing 
and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432 (1988); Sunstein, Lochner's Leg-
983 
984 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88:983 
American legal philosophy and its first-born, constitutional theory,3 
individualism reached its zenith in the rights-based theories and argu-
ments that have dominated discourse since John Rawls' A Theory of 
Justice. 4 The dissatisfaction is expressed most completely by revision-
ist scholars calling for the revival of commitment to the common, or 
public, good, beyond the sum of individual goods.5 These revisionist 
writings are generally categorized under the rubric of civic republican-
ism:6 civic, to distinguish the enterprise from capital R Republican-
acy, 87 CoLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987); Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. 
L. REv. 421 (1987); Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1129 (1986); Sunstein, Two Faces of Liberalism, 41 U. MIAMI L. REv. 245 (1986); Sunstein, 
Madison and Constitutional Equality, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. 11 (1986); Sunstein, Interest 
Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interest 
Groups]. 
In the disaffection with extreme individualism I include Professor Kenneth Karst's seminal 
work on community: K. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE 
CONSTITUTION (1989) [hereinafter K. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA]; Karst, Paths to Be-
longing: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303 (1986); Karst, Woman's 
Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447 (1984); Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term - Foreword: 
Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977) [hereinafter 
Karst, Equal Citizenship]; and the growing body of feminist jurisprudence: Bartlett, Feminist 
Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829 (1990); Minow, The Supreme Coprt 1986 Term -
Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REv. 10 (1987); Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Femi-
nine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986) [hereinafter Sherry, Civic 
Virtue and the Feminine Voice]; Sherry, Women's Virtue, 63 TuL. L. REV. 1591 (1989); West, 
The Authoritarian Impulse in Constitutional Law, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 531 (1988); West, Juris-
prudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988); West, Law, Rights, and Other Totemic 
Illusions: Legal Liberalism and Freud's Theory of the Rule of Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV, 817 
(1986); West, Submission, Choice, and Ethics: A Rejoinder to Judge Posner, 99 HARV L. REV. 
1449 (1986); West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral a11d 
Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384 (1985) [hereinafter 
West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice]; West, Jurisprudence as Narrative: All Aesthetic Analysis 
of Modern Legal Theory, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 145 (1985). 
3. See Collins & Skover, The Future of Liberal Legal Scholarship, 87 MICH. L. REV. 189, 
189-212 (1988) (describing rights-orientation of American constitutional theory). 
4. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). As Robert Nozick described Rawls' influence, 
"(p]olitical philosophers now must either work within Rawls' theory or explain why not." R. 
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 183 (1974); see also Collins & Skover, supra note 3, at 
220-39. Collins and Skover "note that 21 of the 25 most-cited constitutional law articles in 
American law journals published from 1947 to 1985 are dedicated to individual rights issues." 
Id. at 220 n.121. The most influential examples of rights theories include R. DWORKIN, TAKING 
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL RE· 
VIEW (1980); D. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW (1977); L. TRIBE, CONSTITU· 
TJONAL CHOICES 165-266 (1985). I include in the category of individualists the law and 
economics theorists, because, although many critics categorize the law and economics movement 
as utilitarian, and thus not inherently individualistic, law and economics theory partakes of that 
subset of utilitarianism that equates social good with the sum of individual wealth-maximizing 
decisions. See, e.g., A. KRONMAN & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LA w (1979); 
W. LANDES & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987); R. POSNER, 
EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986); R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981). 
5. See, e.g .. Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 2, at 1507-08 (distinguishing pluralism as 
not directed "towards any common ideal or self-transcendant end"); Sunstein, Beyo11d the Re-
publican Revival, supra note 2, at 1554-55. 
6. As Paul Brest pointed out recently, the phrase is redundant, but useful. Brest, Further 
Beyond the Republican Revival 97 YALE L.J. 1623, 1623 n.l (1988). 
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ism; and republican, to emphasize. self-rule through political 
participation and deliberative decisionmaking. 7 . 
To this date, however, the revisionists' prescriptions for change 
have centered largely on directing the process of lawmaking and judi-
cial review toward a public-regarding process, not on the substance of 
the good life for individuals or societies. 8 There are at least two rea-
sons for this restraint. First, the civic republicans are haunted by the 
ghost of Earl Warren. 9 The revision began, and,. to some extent re-
mains associated with, the role of the federal judiciary as the most 
meaningful source of legal and social change.10 Yet, concerns of self-
government, also a part of the civic republican position, 11 become 
most exigent when appointed, life-tenured judges are assigned the task 
of reading the Constitution to embody an affirmative theory of the 
social good. This institutional concern is related to the second and 
substantive barrier to change - the association of speculation about 
the nature of the good life with the apocalyptic horsemen so often 
decried by the liberal academic consensus: social hierarchy, elitism, 
exclusivity, and authoritarianism. In balking at the authoritarianism, 
the civic republican theorists reflect the strong appeal of liberal indi-
vidualism; in balking at the elitism, the tug of liberal egalitarianism. 
For these reasons, having moved the discussion from the extreme indi-
vidualism of rights theories to a more communal stance, civic republi-
can scholarship stops short of articulating the ends to which the 
community should aspire, producing a theory accurately described re-
7. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 2, at 1541. 
8. This is a point I have made before. Hirshman, Bronte; Bloom and Bork: An Essay on the 
Moral Education of Judges, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 177, 184-85 (1988) [hereinafter Hirshman, 
Bronte; Bloom and Bork] (citing Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, supra note 2, at 918); Hirshman, 
Foreword: Kicking Over the Traces of Self-Government, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 435, 443 (1988). 
Sunstein's recent Standing and the Privatization of ~ublic Law, supra note 2, is typical in calling 
for greater citizen involvement in decisionmaking, in this case of the important "fourth branch" 
of government, but failing to articulate the goods that are to be sought in the review process. 
Most recently, Sunstein has proposed the goals of "nonsubordination" and "risk management,'' 
as alternatives to the traditional ends of compensatory justice. Sunstein, The Limits of Compen-
satory Justice, (forthcoming in NoMos). Yet, even assuming that these phrases are stand-ins for 
the values of equality and security, even equality and security are ultimately instrumental· to, 
rather than definitional of, the good. See infra Part II. 
9. See Abrams, Law's Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J, 1591-92, 1597-98, 1604 (1988). As 
Professors Collins and Skover reminded us, in their timely and provocative essay, the publication 
of which corresponded almost to the day with the fifth (of six possible) national electoral victory 
of the representatives of American political conservatism, "Earl Warren is Dead." Collins & 
Skover, supra note 3, at 189. 
10. See Michelman, Traces of Self Government, supra note 2; Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra 
note 2, at 49-59, 86. Lately Sunstein has been moving away from this narrow focus. Sunstein, 
Lochner's Legacy, supra note 2, at 886, 891-92. 
11. See Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 2, at 1504; Sunstein, Beyond the Republican 
Revival, supra note 2. 
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cently as "a muted hybrid."12 
This· article attacks the barriers to articulation of a theory of the 
good and advocates discussion of the substance of a good regime, spe-
cifically, a good American regime. 13 Part I of this article addresses in 
some detail the civic republicans' revival of interest in the common 
life. I propose that it is dauntingly difficult, if not impossible, to artic-
ulate a satisfying version of a common life without a theory of the 
good life, an undertaking traditionally associated with authoritarian-
ism and elitism. Rather than abandoning the enterprise, however, I 
propose to reopen the assumption that the association automatically 
rules out any undertaking. Toleration of some hierarchical ordering is 
required in order to open the dialogue over the meaning of a good life. 
Beginning with this assumption, I next assert that the classical vision 
of personal and civic virtue14 offers the best starting place for such a 
discussion.15 In addressing the American regime (although admit-
tedly in the context of utopian speculation), I begin with the classical 
virtue of liberality because it is the virtue most pertinent to the failings 
of that regime. 
The classical virtue of liberality is "the mean with regard to 
wealth."16 Liberality "resides ... in the state of character of the 
12. Abrams, Law'.\- Republicanism, supra note 9, at 1591; see also Epstein, Modern Republi· 
canism - Or the Flight from Substance, 91 YALE L.J. 1633 (1988); Fallon, What ls Republican· 
ism, and ls It Worth Reviving?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1695, 1732 (1989); Lyons, Substance, Process 
and Outcome in Constitutional Theory, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 763 (1987); Powell, Reviving 
Republicanism, 91 YALE L.J. 1703, 1710 (1988); Tushnet, Anti-Formalism in Recent ConstitU· 
tional Theory, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1502, 154042 (1985). 
13. Classical political philosophy differs from the modern because of its focus on the best 
regime. Since Aristotle, political theorists have known that a dialogue over the best regime be· 
gins with the participants' "primary concern" for their own regime. M. NUSSBAUM, THE FRA· 
GlLITY OF GOODNESS 240-63 (1986); Pangle & Tarcov, Epilogue in HISTORY OF POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 932 (L. Strauss & J. Cropsey 3d ed. 1987). 
14. See infra text accompanying notes 64-70. 
15. As political philosopher Leo Strauss put it, well before the current republican revival: 
[D]emocracy is the regime that stands or falls by virtue: a democracy is a regime in which 
all or most adults are men of virtue, and since virtue seems to require wisdom, a regime in 
which all or most adults are virtuous and wise .... Democracy, in a word, is meant to be an 
aristocracy which has broadened into a universal aristocracy. 
L. STRAUSS, LIBERALISM, ANCIENT AND MODERN 4 (2d ed. 1989). The error in Strauss' inden-
tification of adults as men is beyond the scope of this article. But see Hirshman, Bronte; Bloom 
and Bork, supra note 8; s. OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY (1990). As Strauss 
students Thomas Pangle and Nathan Tarcov summed up recently, "[l]iberal democracy remains 
a form of republicanism." Pangle & Tarcov, supra note 13, at 928. 
16. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS IV.I at 79 (Ross trans. 1925) (World's Classics Pa-
perback ed. 1980) [hereinafter ARISTOTLE, ETHICS]. In my references to the Politics and the 
Nicomachean Ethics, I am deliberately forgoing the traditional citation to the Bekker edition of 
the Greek text of Aristotle of 1831, which seem to me to be anachronistic at best and probably 
affected as well. The Oxford paperback edition of the Ross translation of the Ethics is readily 
available, as is the Oxford edition of the Barker Politics. 
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giver," not in the amount of wealth he possesses.17 The "liberal" man 
possesses the habitual disposition to exercise moderation with regard 
to money and property, a moderation amounting almost to indiffer-
ence.18 He cares for money and property only to the extent that he 
may have enough to exercise the active virtue of giving the right 
amounts "to the right people, at the right time."19 
Part I contrasts classical liberality with the modem treatment of 
distribution of wealth as a matter of right. In Part I, I show how each 
of the two most influential modem theories - Kantian individualism 
and utilitarianism - requires the giver to forgo distinctions among 
recipients and that this neutral viewpoint leads to an impasse between 
the demand for increasingly heroic behavior and the need for a cutoff 
to heroism. The escape, I suggest, lies in the judgment and modera-
tion that are aspects of classical virtue. In this case, the virtue of liber-
ality makes it possible to choose among contenders for redistribution, 
in the interest of a good common life. 
Part II is an effort to apply the theoretical insights of Part I to the 
American regime. In Part II, I address what, I think, most observers 
of the American scene would agree is the nastiest contemporary 
American problem: the persistence of the underclass. The problem 
has two parts: it is a practical danger, and it reflects a failure of virtue, 
in an Aristotelian sense. Part II contends that this failure of virtlle is 
attributable in substantial part to the treatment of all redistribution of 
wealth as a subset of modem distributive justice rather than as an in-
dependent virtue. As set forth below, American society, for historical, 
social, and political reasons, 20 fails almost entirely to articulate redis- · 
tributive claims; the inability to make a claim of right for the under-
class then closes the discussion.21 This failure of rights analysis to 
alleviate the plight of the underclass reached its high water mark in 
the Supreme Court decision in San Antonio Independent School Dis-
trict v. Rodriguez, 22 rejecting a rights claim for equal funding of public 
schools. Despite the best efforts of legal academics to squeeze some 
redistributive claims into the language of the fourteenth amendment,23 
17. Id. at 81. 
18. Id. at 36-40. 
19. Id. at 79-82; see infra notes 80-105 and accompanying text. The use of the male pronoun 
is after Aristotle, not this author. 
20. J. HOCHSCHILD, WHAT'S FAIR?: AMERICAN BELIEFS ABOUT DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
17, 20-21 (1981). 
21. See infra notes 193-212 and accompanying text. 
22. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
23. See, e.g., Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the 
Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1987); Karst, Citizenship, Race, and Marginality, 30 WM. & MARYL. 
REV. 1 (1988); Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term -Foreword: On Protecting the Poor 
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the avenue of constitutional rights claims has remained firmly closed. 
Further, even setting aside the issues of institutional competence and 
textual fidelity that always muddy a constitutional claim, the weakness 
of purely moral rights claims to redistribution has meant largely non-
existent or ineffective legislative solutions.24 The problem of the 
American underclass will never be solved unless analysts break the 
stranglehold of rights analysis on modem political thought and con-
sider the claims of virtue - an analytic frame in which decisions are 
based at least in part on the moral well-being of the actor and the 
society, and in which discrimination among claimants is a desirable 
element of the virtue. 
. In Part II, I suggest that the preferred application of liberality to 
the problem of the underclass would be public, federal, and legislative. 
Public, because the laws help habituate people to virtue and because 
the virtue of liberality serves the common interest of social peace; fed-
eral, because, since the New Deal at least, social welfare has had a 
primarily federal locus and education to virtue will be undermined if 
people can easily avoid the laws; legislative, because the revival of the 
virtue of liberality in a civic republican state should lie with the repre-
sentative branch, which comes the closest to the direct exercise of vir-
tue by the citizens themselves, and because implementing liberality 
will require social and political judgments of some sensitivity that can 
be tempered and refined in the legislative process.25 Proposals for re-
distribution are never in short supply; this article concludes by simply 
reminding the reader of two proposals afloat in the social science com-
munity for an impressive length of time: early childhood education 
and broad-based programs of ideological, behavioral and economic 
assistance for the estranged adults of the underclass. 
I. THEORY 
A. Community Without Virtue 
Farber and Frickey tell us that legal scholarship is not only deriva-
tive, but, worse, takes up ideas from other disciplines just as they are 
about to be rejected there.26 Certainly, legal republican theorists read-
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969); Taylor & Brown, Equal Pro· 
tection, and the Isolation of the Poor, 95 YALE L.J. 1700 (1986). 
24. See infra Part 11.B.2. 
25. See Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the 
Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1567 (1988); Mikva, Symposium on the Theory of Public 
Choice: Foreword, 14 VA. L. REv. 167 (1988). 
26. Farber & Frickey, supra note 2; see also Abrams, supra note 9. 
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ily acknowledge their sources in other disciplines. 27 First, they draw 
on the work of revisionist historians of the founding who purport to 
find a strand of civic republicanism running from Machiavelli through 
the English Whigs to the Framers. 28 This republican revival interprets 
the founding as including the value of deliberative democracy with an 
eye to a public or common good. This interpretation stands against 
the traditional understanding of the founding as a purely Lockean 
scheme for accommodating selfish or private interests.29 
In addition to relying on a revised version of the American consti-
tutional story, legal republicanism also draws on contemporary criti-
cism of the extreme individualism of American liberal society, a 
criticism that appears in a number of disciplines, including sociology, 
philosophy, and political theory.30 The philosophical criticism of lib-
eralism asserts that people take their identities from social instit'utions 
and social ends and that they desire to and can articulate a vision of 
the good from that communal frame.31 Theories, like John Rawls' 
landmark A Theory of Justice, which set to the side those truths about 
human nature in favor of constructing hypothetical individuals, rest 
on a false notion of humanity and are thus philosophically flawed. 32 
The sociological and political criticism asserts that, insofar as Ameri-
can society has evolved toward the_ liberal vision of human behavior, it 
produces lives for its members that are alienated, stripped of meaning, 
and devoid of significant human communities on every level, including 
27. See, e.g., Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 2, at 1494 & nn.3-4 (citing J. APPLEBY, 
CAPITALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL ORDER: THE REPUBLICAN VISION OF THE 1790s (1984); B. 
BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967); F. MACDON-
ALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1985); 
D. MCCOY, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC: POLITICAL EcONOMY IN JEFFERSONIAN AMERICA 
(1980); J. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND 
THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERI-
CAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969); Shalhope, Republicanism and Early American Historiography, 
39 WM. & MARY Q. 334 (1982); B. BARBER, supra note 2; HABITS OF THE HEART 28-31 & 
passim; R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 2; A. MACINTYRE, supra note 2; c. TAYLOR, Kant's Theory 
of Freedom, in 2 PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 318 
(1985); Cornell, Toward a Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 291 
(1985); Herzog, Some Questions for Republicans, 14 POL. THEORY 473 (1986); Sandel, The Pro-
cedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self. 12 POL. THEORY 81 (1984)). 
28. See J. POCOCK, supra note 2; G. Wooo, supra note 2; cf. Shalhope, supra note 27 (dis-
cussing several historians' _approaches toward republicanism). 
29. See T. PANGLE, THE SPIRIT OF MODERN REPUBLICANISM 28 (1988); Sunstein, Beyond 
the Republican Revival, supra note 2, at 1540. 
30. See supra note 27. 
31. E.g., A. MACINTYRE, supra note 2, at 221 ("I find myself a part of history and that is 
generally to say, whether I like it or not, whether I recognize it or not, one of the bearers of a 
tradition."). 
32. See Gutmann, Communitarian Critics of Liberalism, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 308, 309-10 
(1985). 
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the level of politics. 33 
In the years since the republican revival among historians, other 
scholars have undertaken to rebut the purported rediscovery.34 Re-
gardless of whether historical republicanism turns out to be a minor or 
major theme in the primal foundational myth,35 the communitarian 
critique of liberal philosophy and society, being rooted in several 
strains of social theory, remains a viable and important development 
in contemporary American thought. The communitarian critique is 
compelling in part because it is but the most recent manifestation of 
long-standing social and philosophical concerns with community and 
the formation of communal values, a concern that reaches back at 
least to Rousseau and Nietzsche. 36 As the heirs of Rousseau and 
Nietzsche, the communitarians take their places as modern philoso-
phers of the historicist school. They are modern, because, although 
searching for moral meaning and a theory of the good, they eschew 
the utopian speculation about the good life for humans and the best 
political order traditionally associated with classical political theory.37 
Within the modern classification, as historicists, the communitarians 
focus on human behavior in actual communities, rather than trying to 
create hypothetical social organization to promote understanding.38 
Still, a concern with community does not necessarily compel either 
modernism or historicism. As this article sets forth, the association of 
a concern for community with distinctly pre-modern speculation on 
the best life for human beings is certainly a well-established, indeed, 
perhaps the oldest, tradition in political philosophy.39 As will be more 
33. See generally HABITS OF THE HEART, supra note 2; B. Barber, supra note 2. 
34. See J. DIGGINS, THE LOST SOUL OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1984); H. STORING, WHAT 
THE ANTI-FEDERALIS'rS WERE FOR (1981); Appleby, Republicanism in Old and New Contexts, 
43 WM. & MARY Q. 20 (1986); Appleby, The Social Origins of American Revolutionary Ideology, 
64 J. AM. HIST. 935 (1977-78); Kerber, The Republican Ideology of the Revolutionary Genera-
tion, 31 AM. Q. 474 (1985); Powell, supra note 12. 
35. As Sunstein properly notes, "History does not supply conceptions of political life that 
can be applied mechanically to current problems." Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revfral, 
supra note 2, at 1539; see also Hirshman, Brome; Bloom, and Bork, supra note 8, at 181-82 
(describing the political rejection ofinterpretivism as espoused in J. ELY, supra note 4, at 43-44). 
36. See L. STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 252-53 (1953). 
37. Here I am self-consciously adopting Leo Strauss' position. 
The classics understood the moral-political phenomena in the light of man's highest virtue 
or perfection, the life of the philosopher or the contemplative life .... The new philosophy 
takes its bearings by how men live as distinguished from how they ought to live; it despises 
the concern with imagined republics and imagined principalities." L. STRAUSS, THOUGHTS 
ON MACHIAVELLI 295-96 (1957). 
3S. See L. STRAUSS, supra note 36, at 13-16 (describing the relation of historicism to theory 
and actuality). 
39. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 5 (E. Barker trans. 1946) ("(M]an is by nature 
an animal intended to live in a polis.") [hereinafter ARISTOTLE, POLITICS]. 
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fully set forth below,40 classical communitarianism differs from histor-
icist communitarianism in linking the value of community ultimately 
to human nature fa general, rather than focusing only on the particu-
lars of historical or existing societies.41 Communitarianism, therefore, 
is neither necessarily modern nor historicist. The contemporary com-
munitarians, however, are both, and their theory has the strengths and 
weaknesses of both. 
As historicists, they have the strength of the unassailably gritty, 
detailed, documented and compelling "tales" from real communi-
ties;42 compared to these concrete human experiences, the abstractions 
necessary to the systems-building communitarians reject seem impov-
40. See infra text acco~panying notes 63-68. 
41. Conversely, utilitarianism, a very theoretical and nonhistoricist theory about human sys-
tems, seeks the greatest good for the greatest number, producing results with a profoundly com-
munitarian implication. See Fuller, Jeremy Bentham and James Mill in HISTORY OF POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 24, at 714-15. 
42. Probably the best stories are in Habits of the Heart. Here is an abridged version of one of 
them: · 
Joe Gorman 
•.. Joe has always lived in the small town where his father and mother have spent most 
of their lives: Suffolk, Massachusetts, a community of fewer than 20,000 people, about a 
half-hour's drive from Boston. Suffolk was founded 1632, and about six months before one 
of us interviewed Joe Gorman, the town celebrated its 250th anniversary. Joe had taken 
charge of organizing the celebrations, although he had not originally been asked to do so. 
During the early phases of planning the anniversary festivities, the town manager appointed 
a committee of locally prominent townspeople that did not include Joe. But the problem 
was that practically none of its members had much experience in planning such a compli-
cated event. To make matters worse, according to Joe, about half of them were more inter-
ested in getting their names in the paper than in doin_g much work. As a result, the first 
event jn the long series of planned anniversary celebrations had been a fiasco - a large 
community dinner with only enough food for about half of the people who showed up. Joe 
Gorman knew that he had the ability to organize the celebrations successfully, and he felt a 
kind of duty to do whatever he could to help. So he got himself on the committee and 
became, in fact if not in name, its head. · 
Under Joe's direction, the anniversary celebration turned out to be a grand success. The 
festivities stretched out for nine months. There were parades, concerts, a carnival, athletic 
contests, dinners, dances and ecumenical religious services, all well attended and smoothly 
organized. The fundamental meaning of the celebration was expressed for Joe in the slogan: 
"We are doing it together." As he put it, "That's so important - to work to get as many 
people as possible active." Another key theme was the importance of the family. The inspi-
ration for many of the events came from the fact that that year had been proclaimed by the 
United Nations to be "the year of the family." For Joe, the highlight of the festivities was a 
softball tournament in which each team was made up of members of a different extended 
family. "We had eight clans - eight big families from Suffolk-in the tournament. In one 
of them some people came clear from Connecticut just to play softball on the side of the 
family. You know, for me the best time of the whole celebration was standing there back 
behind the bleachers after the softball games with members of the families that had played 
and talking with them about their families and drinking champagne. That to me was the 
ultimate. During the games between the clans, on many occasions, lots of people showed up 
besides the players to watch the game and see how people in the families were doing." 
HABITS OF THE HEART, supra note 2, at 8-9. When feminist legal scholar Robin West went 
searching for a richer model of humanity than the law and economics scholars imagined, she 
found a universe of riches in the stories of Franz Kafka. See West, Authority, Autonomy, and 
Choice, supra note 2. Similarly, in describing the concept of equal citizenship for women, Profes-
sor Karst said it, Karst, Equal Citizenship, supra note 2, at 1, 32, 57-59, but Hawthorne said it 
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erished models of human conduct, indeed. But because shared notions 
of the good life are limited to those held by the members of any partic-
ular community at any given time, historicism has the weakness of 
being ultimately value-relative.43 More significantly, being modem as 
well as historicist, contemporary communitarian theory lacks not only 
a universal standard for the good life, but any relevant standard of the 
good life, describing people merely as they are. Thus, although by 
intuition and experience we may agree with the communitarians that 
people derive their identities and satisfactions at least in part from 
membership in a community, we are ultimately driven to ask why we 
should care about a philosophy that instructs us to pursue ultimately 
meaningless (but communal) activities any more than we should care 
about the ultimately meaningless individualist goals of the theories the 
communitarians attack. 
Predictably, the introduction of lawyers onto the civic republican 
scene has not changed the fundamental limits of the social and philo-
sophical theory. As Richard Fallon has recently pointed out, the ju-
risprudential republican revival, operating as it does "at the border 
between constitutional law and political theory"44 has produced to 
date a "watery"45 hybrid, which resembles liberalism almost as much 
as it represents a new approach.46 
Thus, having spent several years trying to articulate a legal variant 
of communitarian theory, the two leading advocates of republican ju-
risprudence remain arrested in a procedural stance. Frank 
Michelman's most recent prescription, for an open and empathetic leg-
islative and judicial dialogue that mimics the republican ideal of self-
govemance, founders on the Scylla of liberal criticism, that govern-
mental dialogue, however elevated, inevitably culminates in coer-
cion, 47 or the Charybdis, that "the concept can generate few 
guarantees as to substantive outcomes. Who knows what conclusions 
better. Hirshman, Bronte; Bloom and Bork, supra note 8, at 217·24 (describing citizenship in 
Hawthorne's Scarlet Letter). 
43. See Fishkin, Defending Equality: A View from the Cave (Book Review), 82 MICH. L. 
REV. 755 (1984) (reviewing M. WALZER, supra note 2). 
44. Fallon, supra note 12, at 1733. 
45. Id. at 1734. 
46. Id. at 1730-31 ("Michelman's republicanism overlaps importantly with familiar elements 
of what would usually be regarded as the liberal tradition"; "Sunstein's republicanism .•• is 
avowedly 'liberal.' He accepts, for example, that a just society would recognize rights elevated 
above the debates characterizing ordinary politics, and he argues that the liberal commitment to 
government neutrality ought to be upheld at least in modified form."). 
47. See id. at 1728 ("Professor Cover's stark diagnosis rings all too true: in a morally and 
politically pluralistic culture, losers in the judicial process ... commonly experience their defeats 
as ~urispathic' - as destructive of law and moral rights as they view them ..•• "). 
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might issue?"48 Cass Sunstein has, for some years, been honing a ju-
risprudential theory of community that uses judicial review of legisla-
tion to enforce a civic republican concept of rational deliberation to 
reason toward the common good.49 Here, too, however, without a 
substantive conception of the good, the theory remains little more than 
one of political good manners. 
At this point, then, legal republicanism faces two problems: First, · 
the individualist habit of mind is a hard one to break. 50 Second, 
although one might be willing and able to behave in an otherwise 
unacceptably authoritarian fashion for some secure notion of the good, 
the current republicans, being modern at bottom, claim to be agnostic 
as to the good.51 Thus, republican jurisprudence faces the same chal-
lenge as communitarian historicism: Why should we prefer an ulti-
mately meaningless common enterprise to a meaningless individual 
one?52 
An increasing body of legal and related scholarship has turned 
once again to speculation about the good life for human beings. In 
separate writings, Owen Fiss and Anthony Kronman have each pur-
sued such inquiries, looking to the education, training and inclination 
of lawyers as providing an opportunity for the exercise of -practical 
wisdom in pursuit of a virtuous life. 53 Kronman undertakes to show 
48. Id. at 1729. 
49. Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 2; Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, supra 
note 2, at 1579-81. 
50. The conflict between autonomy and community is, of course, the sticking place. See 
Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 2, at 1501 ("self-government ... seems to express a 
demand that we are aJJ bound to respect as a primal requirement of political freedom ... the 
people's determination for themselves of the norms that are to govern their social life"); Sunstein, 
Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 2, at 1554 ("The process of mediation is designed to 
produce substantively correct outcomes ... through the ultimate criterion of agreement among 
political equals."). It is evidence of the thin ether of republicanism that Professor Martha Mi-
now's recognition that "some voices will lose," Minow, supra note 2, at 92, is treated as a tough 
statement of political reality. And, compared to the "dangling conversation," Abrams, Law's 
Republicanism, supra note 9, at 1599, of civic republican discourse, it is a tough statement. 
51. See, e.g., Cass, The Perils of Positive Thinking: Constitutional Interpretation and Negative 
First Amendment Theory, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1405 (1987); Regan, Community and Justice in 
Constitutional Theory, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1073 (1985); Rhode, Association and Assimilation, 81 
Nw. U. L. REV. 106 (1986); Shiffrin, Liberalism, Radicalism, and Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA 
L. REV. 1103, 1156 (1983); West, Liberalism Rediscovered: A Pragmatic Definition of the Liberal 
Vision, 46 U. PrIT. L. REV. 673 (1985); West, The Authoritarian Impulse in Constitutional Law, 
supra note 2, at 543. Michelman put it more boldly. See Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 
2, at 1504 ("I do not know what is good for the soul."). I suppose Plato would be pleased at the 
concern, anyway. 
52. I am hardly the first to suggest that we should not. See, e.g., A. BLOOM, THE CLOSING 
OF THE AMERICAN MIND 38-39 (1987); J. FISHKIN, THE LIMITS OF OBLIGATION (1982); W. 
GALSTON, JUSTICE AND THE HUMAN GOOD 7, 14-53 (1980); M. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, 
AND LAW (1988); L. STRAUSS, supra note 36. 
53. Piss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1986); Kronman, Living in the 
Law, 54 u. CHI. L. REV. 835 (1987). 
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that the value of a "life in the law" is the opportunity to develop and 
display "excellence of character";S4 his work thus tracks the most pri-
vate aspect of the classical tradition, the development of personal vir-
tue. ss Fiss makes a transition to a larger stage by asserting that such 
character and tradition enables the judiciary to give meaning to our 
public values at critical junctures: 
In this account of adjudication I recognize that I am making an empiri-
cal assumption about the richness of the legal system in a country such 
as the United States. I am assuming that our legal culture is sufficiently 
developed and textured so as to yield a body of disciplining rules that 
constrains judges and provides the standards for evaluating their work. S6 
Kronman's work is especially useful in reopening, in a modest con-
text, the possibility of personal virtue as a general concept of the 
human good. I want to take the discussion to a more ambitious level 
by suggesting that the personal virtues Kronman and others invoke in 
this limited sphere play a role in guiding the behavior of citizens on 
the larger stage of the political community and ultimately shed light 
on what a good community should be. In this undertaking, I am con-
sciously, and, I hope, critically, disagreeing with Sunstein's position 
that "modem republicans invoke civic virtue primarily in order to pro-
mote deliberation in the service of social justice, not to elevate the 
character of the citizenry."s7 It will be my contention, although 
hardly original, that the goal of social justice cannot be understood 
absent a conception of the good life for human beings and the role of 
the society in that life; the character of the citizenry is inextricably 
intertwined with the larger social issues. ss 
In returning the discussion to the good life for human beings and 
the relationship between personal virtue and the public good, I con-
sciously choose to engage in utopian political philosophy. Some years 
ago, in his nee-Aristotelian treatment of the subject, political philoso-
pher William Galston restated the arguments for such an undertaking: 
Utopian thought performs three related political functions. First, it 
guides our deliberation, whether in devising courses of action or in 
choosing among exogenously defined alternatives with which we are con-
fronted. Second, it justifies our actions; the grounds of action are reasons 
that others ought to accept and - given openness and the freedom to 
reflect - can be led to accept. Third, it serves as the basis for the evalu-
ation of existing institutions and practices. The locus classicus is the Re-
54. See Kronman, supra note 53, at 845-46. 
55. Cf Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival supra note 2, at 1541 n.8. 
56. Fiss, supra note 53, at 11. 
57. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 2, at 1550-51. 
58. See infra Part I.B.3 and text accompanying notes 286-92. 
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public, in which the completed ideal is deployed in Plato's memorable 
critique of imperfect regimes. 59 
Galston also describes the characteristics of utopian thought that en-
able it to serve its purposes. "Utopias are images of ideal communi-
ties," whose purpose is to "make explicit and to justify the principles 
on the basis of which such communities are held to be ideal."60 Ac-
cordingly, utopias are intended to be universal; they arise out of our 
experience but are not circumscribed by it; they are "cities of words," 
which may, but need not, exist, and they are constrained by the possi-
bility of human and material preconditions neither illogical nor 
impossible. 61 
Now the enterprise of describing the good life for humans at all, 
much less as the ends of political community, immediately runs up 
against the objections set forth above: substantive notions of the good 
life do not respect individual autonomy and equality. Instead they are 
necessarily hierarchical, elevating certain behaviors and goals over 
others, which may be of equal or greater value in the eyes of the indi-
vidual life-planner. Moreover, notions of the good life frequently re-
flect the current power-holding elite, who project their class, race, 
gender or other group "values" into universal truths. They are exclu-
sive, in that the elite is usually exclusive, excluding people who do not 
share the characteristics valued by the elite. Finally, they are either 
selfish or totalitarian in that, insofar as each individual seeks personal 
virtue, he or she separates from the community of free and equal indi-
viduals; on the other hand, trying to create a virtuous community in-
volves imposing one's will on the same other autonomous beings. 62 
Upon closer examination, this cavalry of objections may be less 
formidable than it appears. First, the objection to a hierarchical or-
dering of human goals is greatly at odds with most peoples' experience 
of their own and others' direction of their lives. Everyone knows you 
can't have it all; ergo, all human lives involve ordering and therefore 
hierarchy. So the objection is not to the act of order, but, rather, to 
the act of imposing the order on other people. Thus, even if the vision 
of the good life were correct, the contention is, freedom is more impor-
tant than virtue, even if we could know it (which, by the way, is a 
hierarchical ordering ranking autonomy over virtue). 
The second line of argument asserts that, even if some lost freedom 
59. W. GALSrON, supra note 52, at 14. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 15-16. There are other conditions, but these are the aspects material to this 
undertaking. 
62. See Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 2, at 1540. 
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were acceptable in exchange for a reliable version of the good life, the 
order imposed may reflect the intellectual hegemony of the elite, 
rather than an independently verifiable view of the good; in this worst 
case, one would achieve neither freedom nor virtue. This objection is 
certainly not without power. However, if the vision of the good is 
wrong, the first problem - conflict between virtue and autonomy -
never arises. Accordingly, the objections from autonomy to any in-
quiry into the nature of the good, although not groundless, are at least 
premature. If and when philosophy reveals a reliable view of the good, 
the debate over communal avenues to that life may begin. Second, and 
equally important, as the revival of communitarianism reflects, even in 
America, autonomy has not always been trump. Instead, depending 
on the context, an acceptable resolution of the competing claims of 
virtue, in both its private and social roles, and ihdividual autonomy 
may vary, and vary considerably. 
Having thus tentatively justified the venture into utopian philoso-
phy, I would begin with some of the principles developed by Aristotle. 
Aristotle's ethical writings are enjoying renewed status in American 
legal philosophy. 63 Writers and thinkers are once again willing to con-
template the possibility of a teleological explanation of human exist-
ence:64 that people's reason, particularly practical reason, may be the 
quality of human life most productive of an understanding of human 
ends; that the capacity to reason carries with it the unique capacity to 
choose to order one's conduct among the claims of passion; and that 
such choosing, if done well, leads to a life of activity in accordance 
with virtue, which is the end, or goal, of human nature. 65 
63. The most ambitious recent effort at confronting the nexus of law and Aristotelian virtue 
is Brosnan, Virtue Ethics in a Perfectionist Theory of Law and Justice, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 335 
(1989). See also Francis, Virtue and the American Family (Book Review), 102 HARV. L. REV. 
469, 480 (1987); Kronman, supra note 53; Solum, The Virtue and Vices of a Judge: An Aristote· 
lian Guide to Judicial Selection, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1735 (1988). 
64. The teleological strain in several influential schools of contemporary legal philosophy 
appears in the works themselves and in the readings of those works by other philosophers of law. 
Thus, Roberto Unger's teleological thought in R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975) 
provides fuel for the analyses of his followers, e.g., Cornell, supra note 27, at. 340·41; Galston, 
False Universality: Infinite Personality and Finite Existence in Unger's Politics, 81 Nw. U. L. 
REV. 751, 754 (1987). Michael Perry's classical intellectual antecedents, M. PERRY, supra note 
52, are the focus of Martin Shapiro's analysis in Shapiro, Morality and the Politics of Judging, 63 
TUL. L. REV. 1555, 1558 (1989). Teleological analyses have also surfaced recently in the context 
ofa revived natural law approach, L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE 7 (1987) ("The 
argument of this book restores the original understanding of natural law as a theory about the 
nature of being, the human condition in particular."), and feminist jurisprudence, Sherry, Civic 
Virtue and the Feminist Voice, supra note 2, at 543, 548. 
65. The description of the role of virtue in ordering one's conduct among the claims of pas-
sion is very well presented in G. VON WRIGHT, THE VARIETIES OF GOODNESS (1963). The 
revival of virtue as an issue in legal philosophy has many strands. Most writers in legal journals 
attribute the revival to the earlier revival of virtue ethics in philosophy and social science. See, 
e.g., Francis, supra note 63, at 483 (Glendon draws on "the contemporary re-emergence of classi-
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The revived interest in Aristotelian concepts of personal virtue, 
while valuable, stops short of the unanswered question of communitar-
ian thought: what are the standards of a good common life? Yet here, 
too, Aristotle's work offers answers. Although the world abounds 
with writings about Aristotle's politics, the current jurisprudential ne-
glect of the political writings warrants reiterating his basic principles 
here. Aristotle wrote that the state must reinforce education with the 
coercive power of the law if the whole world is to live in accordance 
with virtue66 and that, in the pure realm of politics, the polis is neces-
sary for a good human life, because it is the natural arena for the 
uniquely human qualities of language and justice. 67 Critical to the de-
tailed treatment of the virtue of liberality set forth below is the little 
noted fact that Aristotle's polis depended in tum on the citizens' exer-
cise of the virtues described in the Ethics: 
The final end of men is the same whether they are acting individually or 
acting collectively; and the standard followed by the best individual is 
thus the same as the standard followed by the best political constitu-
tion .... The quality of courage and endurance is required for the activi-
ties of occupation: wisdom is required for those of leisure; temperance 
and justice are qualiti~s required at both times .... 68 
The current fashion for Aristotle certainly does not justify simply 
accepting his teachings, but the revival may indicate independent rea-
sons for starting with them. First, the recent return to Aristotle's 
writings on virtue reflects the persistence of the human need "to know 
what we are doing and to be good."69 For no matter how far philoso-
phy has wandered from the Aristotelian beginnings, it has never been 
able to cast loose. The classical project has the endurance we associate 
with fundamental human concerns. Second, Aristotle's work, in con-
trast with that of the many who came after and the one who came 
cal theories of virtue ethics"); Kronman, supra note 53, at 838 ("[I]t is my hope that what I say 
will contribute to the current revival of interest in the question of what it means, more generally, 
to live the life of a person, to have the cares and commitments, the character traits and disposi-
tional attitudes, that give the lives of persons their distinctive shape.") (footnote omitted); Solum, 
supra note 63, 1735 ("In recent years, there has been a revival of interest in Aristotelian moral 
theory, and especially in Aristotle's theory of the virtues.") (footnote omitted). The revival ap-
pears in areas as divergent as the interpretation of the U.C.C., Patterson, Wittgenstein and the 
Code: A Theory a/Good Faith Performance and Enforcement Under Article Nine, 137 U. PA. L. 
REv .. 335, 339 n.14 (1988), and the law of criminal confessions, Sherwin, Dialects and Domi-
nance: A Study of Rhetorical Fields in the Law of Confessions, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 739 
(1988) ("[practical wisdom] is a translation of the Greek term, phronesis. Gadamer translates 
phronesis as 'the virtue of thoughtful reflection' "). 
66. ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, supra note 16, X.9, at 272; see also Brosnan, supra note 63, at 349-
82 (how Jaw promotes virtue by habituation and internalization). 
67. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, supra note 39, at 4-8. 
68. Id. at 321. 
69. A. BLOOM, supra note 52, at 238. 
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before, has a mixture of the theoretical and the practical that is appeal-
ing in a time and culture that is not yet prepared to choose between 
utopianism and modernism. Third, Aristotle's writings have a pru-
dential and flexible quality that fits comfortably with other current 
philosophical enterprises. 70 Assuming, therefore, that we can open a 
discussion of virtue in American public life, what do Aristotle's writ-
ings add to an inquiry into the best American regime? 
B. Liberality, Ancient and Modern 
1. Ancient 
I, for one, do not consider it a drawback that Aristotle's ethics 
were the discussion of "qualities admired or disliked by the cultivated 
Greeks of [his] time."71 One is hard-pressed, 2500 years later, to come 
up with aspects of the human character more promising for a desirable 
personal or communal life than courage, temperance, liberality, munif-
icence, pride, good temper, friendship, truthfulness, ready wit, and 
justice. 72 . 
Maybe Aristotle was onto something. 
Not surprisingly, within the vast body of Aristotle's work, modern 
legal philosophy has focused on what Aristotle called justice in the 
particular sense, "honour or money or safety" in the dealings with 
one's neighbors, 73 rather than justice in the "wide" sense, "which an-
swers to the whole of virtue."74 There are several reasons for this. 
First, modern legal philosophy separates and emphasizes the public 
realm, 75 and, at least in the particular sense in which Aristotle used 
the term, justice is the closest analogue, in classical philosophy, to a 
purely public virtue. Second, Aristotle's categories of particular jus-
tice, distributive ("manifested in distributions of honour or money or 
the other things that fall to be divided among those who have a share 
in the constitution") and rectificatory (concerned with "play[ing] a 
70. Particularly legal philosophy, which, for example, seeks a common ground between tele· 
ological and deontological philosophies. See L. WEINREB, supra note 64; Barnett, Foreword: Of 
Chicken and Eggs- The Compatibility of Moral Rights and Consequentialist Analyses. 12 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POLY. 611 (1989). 
71. W. Ross, ARISTOTLE 202 (1923), quoted in w. HARDIE, ARISTOTLE'S ETHICAL THE· 
ORY 119 (2d ed. 1980). 
72. W. HARDIE, supra note 71, at 118. 
73. ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, supra note 16, at 110. 
74. Id. at 110-11. 
75. Both feminists and republicans repeatedly make this point. See, e.g., MacKinnon, Pri· 
vacy v. Equality Beyond Roe v. Wade, reprinted in c. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 
(1987); Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reforms, 96 HARV. L. 
REV. 1497 (1983); Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, supra note 2. 
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rectifying part in transactions between man and man"), 76 fit comforta-
bly with the rights-oriented theories of the last generation of legal 
philosophy. 77 
I believe, however, that legal, and thereby political, discourse has 
been impoverished by the concentration on Aristotle's particularistic 
justice, and that the time has come to cast off its hegemony openly.78 
Accordingly, I propose to mine other veins, equally rich, but some-
what less worked: Aristotle's writings - and those of others, of 
course - on the virtues other than particular justice, beginning, in 
this article, with liberality.79 
Aristotle saw liberality as one of the virtues pertaining to the use of 
money. so The excesses are prodigality, an excess of giving, and mean-
ness, which can take the form of either an excess of taking or a defi-
ciency of giving. 81 (Since prodigality not accompanied by meanness 
usually ends in poverty, Aristotle recognized that meanness is the 
more common excess. 82) Being more interested in the ultimate uses of 
wealth than in its acquisition, Aristotle focused on giving rather than 
on refraining from wrongful taking. 83 The exercise of judgment in the 
virtue of liberality comes by giving to "the right people, the right 
amounts, and at the right time."84 
There is surprisingly little commentary on this aspect of Aristotle's 
writings. 8s While not all commentators agree that such virtues as lib-
76. ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, supra note 16, at 111. 
77. See Areen, A Need for Caring, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1067 n.47 (1988) (citing Seidman, 
Public Principles and Private Choice: The Uneasy Case for a Boundary Maintenance Theory of 
Constitutional Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1006, 1007 (1987)); Hardiwig, Should Women Think in Terms 
of Rights?, 94 ETHICS 441, 447 (1984); Olsen, supra note 75; Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Femi-
nine Voice, supra note 2, at 543, 564-65 n.98. 
78. In making this proposal, I do not want to understate the contrast between liberality and 
the traditional liberal world-view. As Judith Shklar has recently reminded us, the Kantian gen-
tleman explicitly abjures "liberality or pity or noblesse oblige of any kind, because this might 
humiliate the recipients." J. SHKLAR, ORDINARY VICES 233 (1984). 
79. See ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, supra note 16, at 79-85. In an ideal classical state, the law 
would command virtuous conduct: therefore, to focus on the virtues other than particular justice 
is to remain within justice in the broad sense. As Aristotle expressed it, "This form of justice, 
then, is complete virtue .... " Id. at 108. But I am consciously choosing to redirect the discus-
sion away from Aristotle's particular justice and, thus, as will be more fully set forth below, away 
from the modern concept of justice, which follows Aristotle's narrower version. 
80. ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, supra note 16, at 79. 
81. Id. at 82-84. 
82. Id. at 83, 85. 
83. Id. at 80. 
84. Id. at 80. 
85. See, e.g., ARTICLES ON ARISTOTLE (J. Barnes, M. Schofield & R. Sorabji eds. 1979); 
EssAYS ON ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS (A. Rorty ed. 1980); D. ALLAN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARIS-
TOTLE (2d ed. 1970); W. HARDIE, supra note 71; G. VON WRIGHT, supra note 65. Of course, it 
is difficult to search for what is not there. But see Cox, Aristotle and Machiavelli on Liberty, in 
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erality are "nonmoral"86 issues merely depicting contemporary social 
taste, 87 commentators mainly discuss liberality for the light it sheds on 
Aristotle's attitude toward private property. 88 In the recent The Crisis 
of Liberal Democracy: A Straussian Perspective, 89 Professor Richard 
Cox provides a summary of the general understanding of Aristotelian 
liberality:· it "presupposes the existence of and even the rightness of 
the private ownership of property,"90 and it consists of "a kind of sus-
tained and extensive moderation of the underlying and fundamental 
human passions,"91 thus making it, "in practice ... exceedingly diffi-
cult to make citizens liberal in the true sense of the term."92 
Nor is passion the only barrier to liberality. Focusing on Aris-
totle's requirement that "the liberal man will give property only to the 
'right' people,"93 Cox concludes that "[r]efiection shows that the dis-
crimination, the judgment, and the thoughtfulness required to separate 
the virtuous from the vicious prospective recipients of one's largess 
and to give only to the former make great demands on the moral and 
intellectual character of the giver. " 94 Liberality involves, then, two of 
the critical aspects of virtue: moderation and judgment. 
The connection between the virtue ofliberality and the social order 
is less clear. Because Aristotelian political philosophy generally as-
sumes the identity of personal and political virtue, the state "exists ... 
for the sake of a good life"95 and a political system must preserve itself 
by educating its citizens in the virtues that "support the best political 
system."96 
Although Aristotle did not elaborate on the role of the particular 
virtue of liberality in the public realm, the Politics reveals his assump-
tions about moderation in the pursuit of money and the objects of 
moderation in its retention. For example, in describing the household, 
Aristotle makes the point that wealth is limited to the resources neces-
THE CRISIS OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: A STRAUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE 125 (K. Deutsch & w. 
Soffer eds. 1987). 
86. Cf. w. Ross, ARISTOTLE 204 (1923). 
87. Cf. id. 
88. Irwin, Generosity and Property in Aristotle's Politics, Soc. PHIL. & POLY., Spring 1987, at 
37 (1987); Miller, Aristotle on Property Rights (Mar. 1986) (paper delivered to the Society of 
Ancient Greek Philosophers). 
89. Cox, supra note 85, at 127. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 128. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 129. 
95. ARISTOTLE, PoLmcs, supra note 39, at 5 (emphasis omitted). 
96. Irwin, supra note 88, at 48; see also ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, supra note 39, at 332-33. 
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sary for its subsistence.97 He distinguishes the accumulation of wealth 
obtained by trade, which is potentially unlimited,98 and concludes that 
people pursue the accumulation of excessive wealth due to anxiety 
about their livelihoods, an anxiety so great that they neglect their 
moral well-being.99 In response to this problem, Aristotle reiterates 
the theme of moderation. Disputing Plato's scheme in the Republic of 
common ownership of property, Aristotle distinguishes between the 
love of money, which he accepts as universal, and the "excess" of such 
love, which he condemns. Immediately thereafter, he reminds the 
reader that the function of the form of goodness he calls liberality 
"consists in the proper use which is made of property."100 
It is important to note that, while disagreeing with what he por-
trays as an impractical and extreme suggestion regarding the proper 
allocation problem of property in Plato's Republic, Aristotle explicitly 
and repeatedly relies upon the public enforcement of virtue in moder-
ating the acquisitive passions. Thus, while acknowledging that there 
may be social problems - of obsequiousness to the rich, for example, 
and disputatiousness with one's neighbors - associated with private 
property,101 Aristotle proposes that "the present system [of private 
property] would be far preferable [to communism], if it were adorned 
by customs and by the enactment of proper laws."102 As an "exam-
ple"103 of such legislation, Aristotle refers to the Spartan law, provid-
ing that each citizen must donate a particular share of his property for 
common meals. 104 In his favorable treatment of the Cretan constitu-
tion, Aristotle notes a similar, but superior, arrangement whereby 
common meals are provided from publicly owned property. 105 
Although Aristotle does not elaborate on other arrangements, his use 
of the term "example" clearly implies the existence of other schemes 
for legislation of liberality, serving the general purposes of social peace 
and personal virtue through moderation of the excessive love of 
money. 
97. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, supra note 39, at 26. 
98. Id. at 25. 
99. Id. at 26. 
100. Id. at 50. 
101. Id. at 50-51. 
102. Id. at 49. 
103. Id. at 52. 
104. Id. at 52, 82. 
105. Id. at 52, 81-82. 
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2. Modern 
For our purposes, modern political philosophy diverges from the 
classics in three important ways. Modern philosophy proposes the 
separation of private virtue and political morality; modern philosophy 
accepts the premise of man's imperfection; and modern philosophy 
contemplates the commensurability of all individuals. In this section, 
we will explore the fate of liberality in this modern context. The writ-
ings of John Locke reveal the metamorphosis of classical virtue under 
the impact of the separation of private and public and the premise of 
imperfection. The deontology of Immanuel Kant and the twentieth-
century debates over utilitarianism reflect the development of concepts 
of altruism under the modern assumptions of imperfection and moral 
equality. 
John Locke may stand as the paradigmatic modern social contract 
theorist. Although not the first, he is considered the most influential 
thinker to have separated issues of personal virtue from political phi-
losophy.106 Thus, in modern political philosophy, the personal virtue 
of liberality loses its status as an integrated part of a whole concept of 
justice. 107 This distinction separates the modern from the classical 
treatment of liberality, because, in a classical utopia, whose end is to 
promote the good life for human beings, the virtues are all encom-
passed in the broad justice of obedience to the laws of a good state. 108 
In Locke's construct, a main nonpolitical source of moral direction 
is religion, and, although it is not Locke the theologian who is of inter-
est here, one may note with Locke scholar Thomas Pangle that Locke 
appears to convert the traditional notion of charity as a duty of the 
giver into a very modern claim of right belonging to the subject. 109 
Having noted the separation of the personal virtue from the political 
question of distributive justice, the remaining question is what Locke's 
redistributive intent was. 
Here, there is much debate, largely centering on the so-called 
Lockean "proviso" that acquisitive individuals in the state of nature 
106. L. STRAUSS, supra note 36, at 68-69 (Hobbesian rejection of classical unity); id. at 178 
(Machiavellian rejection of classical utopianism); id. at 213 n.63 (separation of virtue and public 
pursuit of happiness); id. at 221 n.82 (Locke, a follower of Hobbes, replaces love and charity with 
refraining from harm);.c.f. c. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE lNDIVID· 
UALISM 1, 3 (1962). 
107. See T. PANGLE, supra note 29, at 144, 169, 306 n.2. 
108. See ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, supra note 16, at 107-08. 
109. T. PANGLE, supra note 29, at 144, 306 n.2; cf. R. AsHCRAFT, REVOLUTIONARY POLI-
TICS AND LOCKE'S Two Treatises of Government 272 n.186 (1986). Although Pangle indicates a 
disagreement with respected Locke commentator Richard Ashcraft regarding whether Locke's 
charity is a duty or a right, both agree on its limited scope. 
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must leave behind "enough and as good" quality as that taken. 110 At 
one extreme, Leo Strauss and C.B. MacPherson assert that the proviso 
does not survive the state of nature; thus, the right to appropriation of 
property in civil society is unlimited. 111 At the other, John Dunn 
states a generous conception of the ongoing right - to a "sufficient 
and commodious living."112 Dunn has staked out the far ground; 
most discussion assumes a far less generous reading of Locke. Focus-
ing on the whole sweep of his writings, rather than on an isolated pas-
sage, most commentators agree that the Lockean rights-claim to 
redistribution is limited to little more than subsistence, based on the 
natural right to life, with strict disincentives for laziness and 
improvidence. 113 
A passage in Locke's less well-known writings supports this lim-
ited commitment to redistribution. Locke unexpectedly raises the sub-
ject of liberality (even using the classical term) in his essay, "Some 
Thoughts Concerning Education." 114 There, he advises the reader to 
teach children "to part with what they have, easily and freely to their 
friends." 115 The interesting part of Locke's essay is that, in direct con-
trast to the classical teaching of liberality as an antidote to excessive 
attachment to property, Locke advises parents to "constantly tak[e] 
care that [the child] loses nothing by his liberality. Let all the in-
stances he gives of such freeness be always repaid, and with interest; 
and let him sensibly perceive that the kindness he shows to others is no 
ill husbandry for himself."116 Thus, rather than inculcating a detach-
ment from gain, Locke would use long-term attachment to gain to 
generate desirable short-term public behavior. 
The distance between Locke's world and the world of classical phi-
losophy lengthens in his reasons for the desirability of a liberal charac-
ter. For Locke, liberality has no inherent value; instead, by 
inculcating a pattern of liberal behavior early, the parent prepares the 
child to forgo the more serious mistake of injustice: "But because chil-
110. J. LoCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT§ 27 (1947). 
111. L. STRAUSS, supra note 36, at 239-46; c. MACPHERSON, supra note 106, at 211-14. 
112. Dunn, Justice and the Interpretation of Locke's Political Theory, 16 POL. STUD. 68, 82 
(1988). 
113. See, e.g., R. AsHCRAFT, supra note 109, at 272-73; R. NOZICK, supra note 4, at 174-82; 
T. PANGLE, supra note 29, at 169-70; J. TULLY, A DISCOURSE ON PROPERTY: JOHN LOCKE 
AND His ADVERSARIES 131-39, 166 (1980); Rose, ''Enough. and as Good" of What?, 81 Nw. u. 
L. REV. 417 (1987); Stick, Turning Rawls into Nozick and Back Again, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 390 
n. 140 (1987). 
114. J. LOCKE, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, in JOHN LOCKE ON EDUCATION (P. 
Gay ed. 1964). 
115. Id. at 83. 
116. Id. at 83. 
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dren cannot well comprehend what injustice is, till they understand 
property, and how particular persons come by it, the safest way to 
secure honesty, is to lay the foundations for it early in liberal-
ity ..... " 117 What is this injustice Locke is so anxious to avoid? 
"[P]ossessing themselves unjustly of what is another's, whilst there are 
in the world stronger and more men than they." 118 Thus, liberality in 
Locke's world is nothing more than the preparation for participation 
in the Lockean regime of property. 119 Liberality for Locke ceases to 
be a virtue in an Aristotelian sense - that is, a way of being that is 
good in and of itself and essential among the citizens of the good 
regime. 
A second source of modem thought on the subject may be traced 
to Immanuel Kant. Like Locke, in discussing charity, or altruism -
to use another modem term - Kant did not expressly concern himself 
with the issue of public versus private morality. Also as in Locke, 
issues of altruism were not particularly prominent in Kant's work. 
However, Kant's signal contribution to moral philosophy - the cate-
gorical imperative of moral behavior - and his fourth illustration of 
the imperative do speak directly to the question. The categorical im-
perative - that people must "act only on a maxim by which you can 
will that it, at the same time, should become a general law"120 - dic-
tates that we must exercise benevolence in anticipation of the occasion 
when we may anticipate needing similar treatment. 121 Thus, Kant's 
treatment of altruism reflects the modem vision of man as having a 
limited capacity for virtue and sharing equally in a self-centered, but 
egalitarian, uniformity of rights and duties. 
The third and final source of modem political philosophy - utili-
tarianism - reintroduces many of the issues of classical liberality. 
First, utilitarianism, while coexisting with a largely Lockean view of 
the state, is not inherently a philosophy of limited government. In 
fact, limited government is necessary only in one variant, which as-
sumes that the invisible hand of wealth maximization would produce 
utilitarianism's goal of the greatest good for the greatest number.122 If 
117. Id. at 84. 
118. Id. at 85. 
119. I am grateful to Professor Carol Rose for introducing me to the communitarian implicn· 
tions of participating in the Lockean regime. See C. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives 
from Game Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J. L. & HUMANITIES 37 (1990). 
120. I. KANT, Metaphysical Foundations of Morals, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT 172 (C. 
Friedrich ed. 1949) (emphasis omitted). 
121. Id. 
122. See J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLA· 
TION 288-89 (J. Bums & H.L.A. Hart eds. 1970); 8 F. COPLESTON, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 
13 (1966); Fuller, Jeremy Bentham and James Mill in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, 
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government action were required for the utilitarian goal, utilitarianism 
would support such action. Thus, utilitarianism, like classical political 
theory, contemplates, at least, a much more expansive official 
sphere.123 Second, in the period of utilitarian hegemony, most moral 
philosophers did not distinguish benevolence or charity, but accepted 
a simple scheme for acts of moral significance consisting of duty, pro-
hibition, and permission and developed a catalogue of duties and 
prohibitions designed to produce the desired good effects. 124 In this 
exercise, utilitarianism suffered from its inability to draw coherent 
lines around duty, or between giver and recipient. If every action 
must be judged against a duty to produce the greatest good, any distri-
bution has moral consequences, which makes it very difficult to make 
judgments.125 
About a generation ago, in a development interestingly parallelling 
the legal positivism debate, 126 philosophers began to chafe under the 
inadequacy of the utilitarian categories to account for desirable behav-
ior not amounting to an enforceable127 duty. In an influential little 
article, "Saints and Heroes," moral philosopher J.0. Urmson attacked 
this longstanding classification as "totally inadequate to the facts of 
morality"128 because it does not account for acts of supererogatory 
saintliness and heroism, which, while far beyond "duty" as commonly 
understood, are entitled to some moral recognition beyond the thin 
title of "permission." As Urmson put it, 
[W]e need to discover some theory that will allow for both absolute du-
ties, which ... can be exacted from a man like a debt, to omit which is to 
do wrong and to deserve censure, and which may be embodied in formal 
rules or principles, and also for a range of actions which are of moral 
value and which an agent may feel called upon to perform, but which 
supra note 13, at 710, 723-24; Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice: The Relation Between Classical 
Contract Law and Social Contract Theory, 70 IOWA L. REV. 769 (1985). 
123. The current debate over the intrusiveness of utilitarianism goes back at least to the 
Smart/Williams debate in the early 1970s. See J.J.C. SMART & B. WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM 
FOR AND AGAINST (1973). 
124. See Urmson, Saints and Heroes, in MORAL CONCEPTS 60, 67-68 (J. Feinberg ed. 1969). 
125. Cf id. at 71. 
126. See Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. 
REV. 630 (1958); Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 
(1958). 
127. By enforceable, many modem philosophers adopt Mill's simile: one should be able to 
exact performance "as one exacts a debt." J. MILL, UTILITARIANISM 60 (1948); see J. FEIN-
BERG, Supererogation and Rules, in DOING AND DESERVING 6 (1970). In Supererogation, Fein-
berg made the traditional positivist distinction between moral enforceability and legal 
enforceability, the latter involving "civil liability or criminal punishment for nonperformance." 
Id. 
128. Urmson, supra note 124, at 60. 
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cannot be demanded and whose omission cannot be called wrong-
doing.129 
In attempting to articulate a new terminology, Urmson referred 
back to the utilitarian debate that was his immediate intellectual back-
drop. He noted that those acts the utilitarians detailed in attempting 
to describe the ultimate good for their theory - characteristics like 
promise-keeping, abstinence from murder, theft, and the like - actu-
ally had in common a more modest characteristic: they were the mini-
mum qualities necessary for people to live together in society. 130 Here, 
he thinks, lay a possible insight into a new scheme of duty, including 
both those minimum requirements for living together, and actions be-
yond duty, like heroism and saintliness, which, while more elevated 
than permission, could not be exacted.131 
Anticipating the criticism that his scheme lacked a certain moral 
ambition, Urmson defended it on the grounds that a modest moral 
scheme would help people as they actually are or reasonably can be-
come, rather than overreaching in the name of an ideal and failing, 
with the predictable consequence of promoting relativism.132 Unlike 
more demanding schemes of moral value, Urmson's sphere of moral 
duties would give a special status to those matters where universal 
compliance is at a premium; his duties would be within the realm of 
normal human capacity, "formulable in rules of manageable complex-
ity,"133 and formulated in terms of enforceable rules.134 
Not surprisingly, contemporary political theory, heavily influenced 
by Rawls' emphasis on generally applicable rules of social organiza-
tion, focuses on defining duties - in Urmson's terminology, the acts 
we owe to each other simply because of a common membership in 
society. Each of the major sources of modern political theory is repre-
sented in the contemporary debate. The scheme of minimal duties as-
sociated with the traditional reading of John Locke appears in 
Anarchy, State and Utopia, where Robert Nozick asserts that the only 
justifiable state is the minimal state, protecting its citizens against 
force and fraud in the form of "boundary crossings" against existing 
129. Id. at 67. 
130. Id. at 67-68. 
131. Id. at 68. 
132. Id. at 69-72. 
133. Id. at 70. 
134. Id. at 70-73. Although Urmson, like most of the philosophers in this area, was frustrat· 
ingly silent on the obviously relevant legal positivism/natural law debate, his characterization of 
a modest sphere of moral duty sounds amazingly like Lon Fuller's recitation of the internal 
morality of law - the achievement of rules that are predictable, within human capacity, and 
stable. See L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 41-44 (1964). 
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holdings. Although in a universe encompassing more than just the 
political sphere, moral claims may arise beyond this jural sphere of 
rights, Anarchy, State and Utopia is devoid of any reference to moral 
obligations beyond rights; hence, one may assume that no general re-
quirement of even minimal scope exists in this theory. 135 By contrast, 
Rawls expresses an explicit - if somewhat laconic - version of what 
he calls "mutual aid."136 As free and equal moral persons, he posits, 
we owe each other a "natural duty," which attaches without agree-
ments, that, if we can help each other without excessive risk, we 
should do so. 137 Rawls justifies this principle on the watered down 
Kantian grounds that such benevolence would have a pervasive essen-
tial effect on everyday life, knowing that we live in a society where we 
can depend on each other.138 
Like Urmson, Rawls explicitly asserts the superiority of his theory 
to classical utilitarianism on the grounds that it provides a line be-
tween moral duties and supererogatory acts. 139 By contrast, a contem-
porary utilitarian, Peter Singer, embraces the heroic implications of 
utilitarianism, asserting that utilitarianism requires that, "if it is in our 
power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sac-
rificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, 
to do it."140 As Singer recognizes, "the revision in our moral concep-
tual scheme ... would, given the extent of both affi.uence and famine 
in the world today, have radical implications."141 And, as Singer also 
recognizes, the biggest change will be where the line is drawn between 
duty and charity, 142 which, in Singer's scheme, will entail "giv[ing] 
until we reach the level of marginal utility - that is, the level at 
which, by giving more, I would cause as much suffering to myself or 
my dependents as I would relieve by my gift."143 
I sure wouldn't want to live in Singer's world, and Fishkin has 
even written a book to explain why not. 144 Singer's theory, according 
to Fishkin, violates at least two fundamental intuitions about the basic 
structure of individual morality: first, that there is a "cutoff for hero-
ism - the notion that there are limits on what any other person can 
135. This is Fishkin's reading of Nozick. J. FlSHKlN, supra note 52, at 68-69. 
136. J. RAWLS, supra note 4, at 114. 
137. Id. at 114-15. 
138. Id. at 339. 
139. Id. at 117. 
140. Singer, Famine, Affluence, and Morality, 1 PHIL. & Pua. AFF. 229, 231 (1972). 
141. Id. at 236. 
142. Id. at 235-36. 
143. Id. at 241. 
144. J. FISHKJN, supra note 52. 
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demand of us as a matter of duty or obligation"145 and, second, a 
"[r]obust [z]one of [i]ndifference: a substantial proportion of any indi-
vidual's actions falls appropriately within the zone of indifference or 
permissibly free personal choice."146 
Fishkin's insight into Singer's theory would seem to send most 
thinkers running to the shelter of Rawls' self-proclaimed limited altru-
ism. But, according to Fishkin, even under Rawls' minimal formula, 
heroic sacrifice of Singer's type would ultimately be required. 147 First, 
all positions of neutral viewpoint mandate a formula of general 
obligation: 
If we love our neighbors as we love ourselves, we are inexorably led to 
the admission of at least some positive, general obligations .... From any 
of [the neutral] perspectives, some principles of general obligation seem 
undeniable. How would one argue against the principle of minimal al-
truism [obligation to save a human life, if the cost is minor], for example, 
from such a perspective? If I have to consider whether to save a starving 
refugee at minor cost to myself, after I have put myself realistically in 
the shoes of the starving refugee, any reasonable calculation of the inter-
ests at stake will lead me to conform to the obligation. 148 
Rawls' version of neutrality does not escape the theoretical compul-
sion to admit general obligations: 
I am to imagine myself choosing a moral principle out of self-interest 
from behind a "veil of ignorance" which, according to Rawls, makes it 
rational for me to take seriously the possibility that I will occupy the 
worst position. Clearly, I will wish to choose principles that ensure my 
survival and (at least) minimal well-being. The prospect of becoming a 
starving refugee provides a clear motivation for requiring substantial sac-
rifices from those who tum out to occupy the more fortunate positions. 
It should be obvious that a principle of redistribution far more demand-
ing than minimal altruism would be chosen in the original position. Yet 
even minimal altruism is sufficiently demanding, at the large scale, to 
produce our dilemma. 149 
Thus, any altruism above Nozick's zero altruism slides inexorably into 
Singer-like self-sacrifice: 
If every small contribution to famine relief will save a human life or 
prevent other serious harm ... then I am obligated by the principle of 
minimal altruism to give - and to continue giving - until the marginal 
sacrifice involved in any individual act of giving is more than minor. 
The disparity in affluence between the developed countries and the 
world's poor is so enormous that an American citizen of average means 
145. Id. at 7. 
146. Id. at 23. 
147. Id. at 159. 
148. Id. at 34 (emphasis in original). 
149. Id. at 159 (footnote omitted). 
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. . . could give half his income - and it would still be the case that an 
additional small contribution would be a minor sacrifice. If I were re-
duced to half my present (junior faculty) salary, I could still afford to 
give five more dollars. 150 
Yet so inconsistent is this re.suit with our existing intuitions about the 
limits of self-sacrifice that Fishkin feels obliged to conclude: 
[T]hese difficulties pose a challenge that is aim.ed more squarely at liber-
alism than at other ideologies and moral positions. To give up either the 
general obligations that are rooted in impartiality or the limits on moral 
requirements that are presupposed by individualism would represent a 
very great revision in liberal assumptions as well as in the way most of us 
think and act with respect to moral questions. Some great revision in 
our assumptions or in our action is required. 151 
3. The Virtue Connection 
Well, it's an imperfect world.152 And therein, I assert, lies the an-
swer to Fishkin's dilemma. While neutral viewpoints may illuminate a 
piece of the path toward a good life, they just do not light the whole 
way. 153 Neutral viewpoint philosophy having failed to solve the prob-
lem of altruism, either the neutrality or the altruism must be aban-
doned. Nozick presents us with a vision of a world without charity;154 
having rejected that vision, we are left essentially with the classical 
world of nonneutrality. 
In an influential response to Urmson, contemporary philosopher 
Joel Feinberg has opened an avenue that may prove fruitful. 155 Fein-
berg would replace Urmson's scheme of spheres of duty and spheres 
beyond duty into a more neutral division of duty and nonduty, the 
latter being all acts not required, even those acts bearing no relation-
ship to the acts that are required. Feinberg describes the acts of saint-
liness or heroism that inspired Urmson's attack on the earlier moral 
scheme as nonduties, involving excessive sacrifice, but, most signifi-
cantly, distinct because also involving moral worth or praiseworthi-
ness.156 Feinberg gives several examples to illustrate the role of the 
distinction of moral worth; the most graphic is "the greedy adventurer 
150. Id. at 72 (emphasis omitted). 
151. Id. at 171 (emphasis omitted). 
152. Id. at 161 & n.9. Cf. McGuire, The Calculus of Moral Obligation, 95 ETHICS 199, 199-
200, 223 (1985) (altruism must factor in group behavior, which factor affects the linearity and 
equivalence of Fishkin's theory). 
153. See Waldron, When Justice Replaces Affection: The Need for Rights, 11 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POLY. 625 (1988) (arguing that communal bonds are not strong enough to hold our society 
together, and thus we need rights to "fall back on" in failed relationships). 
154. J. FISHKJN, supra note 52, at 68. 
155. See J. FEINBERG, supra note 127. 
156. See id. at 12-13. 
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who sets off on an arduous journey into the heart of the jungle/' 157 
Such an action is not a duty under anyone's scheme and certainly 
sounds excessively hard; nonetheless, the adventurer's journey is not 
something we would consider saintly or heroic, because the critical 
third element - moral worth - is missing. 
In grappling with this core issue of moral worth, Feinberg makes a 
distinction that bears directly on the tough, but seemingly unavoida-
ble, task of choosing avenues of liberality. First, there is an "institu-
tional complex" of concepts of merit, which . 
consists. of (1) essentially jural or institutionally connected rules which 
enjoin, permit, and prohibit, and thus impose duties and obligations, and 
(2) other rules which prescribe procedures for determining merits and 
demerits [i]n such institutions ... in which behavior is in part governed 
by such rules and regulations. 158 
But Feinberg is more interested in "a quite different conception of per-
sonal merit and a quite distinct sort of rule."159 Here "we are con-
cerned with a person's merit or worth, not merely in respect to this or 
that job or office, skill, or function, but 'in the last analysis,' all things 
considered. " 160 In order to make this calculation, Feinberg assumes 
that "there must be some special job of a man as such, so that being 
good at that job confers final, overall worth." 161 Well, you knew it 
had to be in here somewhere: "Man is by nature an animal intended 
to live in a polis, " 162 and judgments about acts of moral worth may be 
made based on what is necessary for a citizen of a good society in 
order to fulfill his nature. 
Thus Feinberg, vocal defender of liberalism, articulates something 
very close to the classical formulation. The Aristotelian vision was of 
a unity of private and public virtue. The virtuous man, exercising 
moderation over his passion for money, is fulfilling not only his own 
nature, but also fits into the need for public peace and for a regime in 
which the middle class predominates. 163 This "good" society places 
us squarely between Urmson's minimal social world and Singer's mil-
lenarian vision, or, to borrow another locution, between "thin democ-
racy" 164 and a smothering authoritarianism. 
157. See id. at 12. 
158. Id. at 14. 
159. Id. at 15. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. at 19. 
162. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, supra note 39, at 5. 
163. Id. at 181-83. 
164. The locution is Barber's. B. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, passim. Bar-
ber analyzes American liberal democracy as inadequately oriented toward public participation. 
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In this good society, the exercise of liberality will serve three pur-
poses which modern distributive justice cannot meet: First, where 
claims of desert do not extend much beyond that necessary for mini-
mal social peace, 165 yet pressing needs exist beyond the recognized 
claims of desert to distributive justice, the exercise of the virtue of lib-
erality may fill the gap. Second, in a good society, there is necessarily 
an arena for behavior that falls far short of the ideal. In the area of 
redistribution, such actions can be experimental,- or simply insuffi-
cient.166 Yet, modern distributive justice always focuses on perfection: 
a state of nature, a social compact, a veil of ignorance, all so that per-
fect equity pertains in all social arrangements. Liberality side-steps 
these utopian barriers to entry. Third, since Hobbes, and certainly 
since Rawls, political philosophy has focused so intently on the lowest 
common denominator of society that it has forgotten the interest of 
the fortunate in a life of virtue. 167 Liberality enables those-capable of 
virtue to use their reason, inter alia, to select recipients of welfare, a 
decision not permitted by the perfect exigencies of rights-based claims 
at either extreme.16s 
In sum, there is no shortage of candidates for the elements of the 
good life - for individuals or for societies. As a first step in examin-
ing some of these candidates, I have suggested the classical virtue of 
liberality: the vision of a society of citizens, moderate in their passion 
for property and enjoying some of the social fruits of peace and stabil-
ity while avoiding the floodgates implications of modern altruism. 
Having made out the general claim for the virtue, I turn, in the next 
section, to the role of liberality in the American regime. 
II. THE NATURE OF THE REGIME169 
The American economic system alone may have never developed 
As a result, peoples' lives lack the discipline of communal dialogue, and political society Jacks 
resistance to totalitarian truth. Id. at 24-25. 
165. See, e.g., HOCHSCHILD, supra note 20,passim (Americans do not typically support sig-
nificant redistributions of wealth); J. PATIERSON, AMERICAN'S STRUGGLE AGAINST POVERTY 
1900-1985 (1986), passim (same); L. KOMISAR, DOWN AND OUT IN THE USA (1974), passim 
(same). 
166. Graham, Justice, Charity and the Third World, 311 MODERN THEOLOGY 21, 29-30 
(1986). 
167. See L. STRAUSS, supra note 15, at ch. 1; L. STRAUSS, supra note 36, at 168-69. 
168. See Selznick, The Idea of a Communitarian Morality, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 445, 446 
(1987) ("The difference principle is founded in rationality and reciprocal advantage, not in sym-
pathy and benevolence."). 
169. The regime is an arrangement of a city with respect to its offices, particularly the one 
that has authority over all matters. For what has authority in the city is everywhere the 
governing body, and the governing body is the regime. As Aristotle makes clear at the 
outset of his discussion, while the regime is in the first instance an institutional arrangement, 
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into a state of fatal inconsistency with republican political ideals with-
out the addition of the "poison"170 of black slavery. Today's reality is, 
however, that race and poverty together have produced one of the few 
social developments (the others being, for instance, aristocratic titles 
and military dictatorship171) inconsistent with even a minimal concept 
of a republican government: a permanent underclass, cut off by walls 
of discrimination, illiteracy, hopeles~ness, and, perhaps worst, lack of 
education for participation in the community. 172 The thesis of this 
Part is that the persistence of this social development - radically in-
consistent with minimum notions of republican politics - demon-
strates the impossibility of separating, as the civic republicans seem to 
attempt, social justice from the character of the citizens. 
A. Background 
We Americans really love our money. 173 Apparently we always 
did. 174 As a commentator of the Jacksonian era expressed it, "In the 
United States the pride of wealth has more force than in any other 
country because there is here no other pride to divide the human 
heart."175 
On the other hand, the civic republican historians have pointed up 
an equally respectable American tradition, which tended to regard 
property as instrumental to the virtue of republican self-governance. 
A man could not be a citizen, this line of thinking went, if he did not 
the regime cannot be properly understood in institutional terms alone. The regime reflects 
more fundamental political realities - the relationships of authority and subordination 
between the different groups that make up the city. For all practical purposes, the 
politically dominant class - the "governing body" (politeuma) - is the regime. 
Lord, Aristotle, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 13, at 139 (citation omitted). 
170. Gest, Civil·Rights Drive Shifts to Low Gear, U.S. News & World Report, July 2, 1984, at 
27. 
171. See w. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF TIIE u. s. CONSTITUTION 11 (1972). 
172. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, A COMMON DESTINY (G. Jaynes & R. Williams 
eds. 1989); w. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED 8 (1987); Auletta, The Underclass (pts. 
1-3), NEW YORKER, Nov. 16, 1981, at 63, Nov. 23, 1981, at 72, Nov. 30, 1981, at 101; Edelman, 
supra note 23; Karst, supra note 23; McLanahan & Garfinkel, Single Mothers and Social Policy, 
501 ANNALS 92, 93-94 & nn.5, 6, 8 (1989); Wacquant & Wilson, The Cost of Racial and Class 
Exclusion in the Inner City, 501 ANNALS 8 (1989); Chicago on Hold: The New Politics of Poverty 
(pts. 1-5), Chi. Tribune, Aug. 29, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 2; Aug. 30, 1988, § 1, at 2, col. I; Sept. I, 
1988, § 1, at 1, col. 2; Sept. 2, 1988, § 1, at l, col. 2; Sept. 4, 1988, § l, at I, col. 3. See generally 
The Ghetto Underclass: Social Sciences Perspectives, 501 ANNALS (1989) (symposium on the 
underclass). 
173. This should hardly require an authority, but should something be helpful, see T. 
WOLFE, THE BONFIRE OF THE VANITIES (1988). Some people even think we wrote the Consti-
tution to protect it, c. BEARD, AN EcONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES (1913). 
174. See T. PANGLE, supra note 29, at 93. 
175. J. DIGGINS, supra note 34, at 145 (1984) (quoting w. GOUGE, A SHORT HISTORY OF 
PAPER MONEY AND BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES 30-33 (1833)), 
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have enough property to provide for his needs; if he were a "slave" in 
his economic relations with other men.176 But two at least potentially 
inconsistent conclusions flow from this argument. Property holdings 
must be secure. But holdings must be relatively equal.177 
The Framers hoped that they had solved the worst of the equality 
problem with the abolition of entail and primogeniture.178 However, 
under the relentless dynamic of capitalism, it early became clear to 
them that they had not; secure property would ever tend to inequality 
and inequality would, in turn, be the source of that threat to the com-
mon good: faction. Facing Shays' rebellion, Madison wrote that only 
a minority "can be interested in preserving the rights of property."179 
Madison's writings, at least, leave little doubt that he found the solu-
tion in size - the large republic would produce a multitude of fac-
tions, none dominant; the large government would produce a 
multitude of governors, similarly situated.180 The size of the Ameri-
can continent would enable the Framers to "reconcile republicanism 
with reality" 181 by the endless availability of western lands. 
The ensuing two centuries reflect the enduring tension between the 
sanctity and equality of property. There is certainly evidence of sepa-
ratism, consigning property and the social relationships it affects to the 
private realm, by, for example, eliminating property qualifications for 
acts of citizenship, like voting. By depriving property of its currency 
in the realm of citizenship, separatism attempts to reconcile the con-
flict between republican demands for wealth-based independence and 
the liberal concept of men as inherently free and self-governing.182 
One might guess that the separation of property from citizenship 
would have worked both ways, protecting property from all incursions 
from the state, as well as protecting citizenship from claims of superior 
wealth, thus creating a kind of pre-political or extra-political realm 
immune from politics.183 Such a simple strategy, however, never pre-
176. L. BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION 51 (1978); D. McCOY, supra note 27, at 
68; F. McDONALD, supra note 27, at 74-75; Historical Introduction to THE POLITICAL WORKS 
OF JAMES HARRINGTON 54 (J. Pocock ed. 1977); Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right to Prop-
erty in Revolutionary America, 19 J.L. & EcoN. 467, 470, 475 (1976); Michelman, Possession, 
supra note 2, at 1329 n.60 (citing D. McCOY, supra note 27, at 60-62, 67-69, 126-27); Steinfeld, 
Property and Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41 STAN. L. REv. 335, 338 (1989); Note, 
Land Reform and Corporate Redistribution: The Republican Legacy, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1229, 
1232-3~ nn.21-23 (1987); J. PococK, supra note 2, at 391. 
177. G. WooD, supra note 2, at 410-11; Note, supra note 176, at 1232-33 nn.21-23. 
178. G. WOOD, supra note 2, at 410-11. 
179. Id. at 411.. 
180. THE FEDERl\LIST No. 10, at 82-83 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). 
181. Note, supra note 176, at 1235. 
182. See Steinfeld, supra note 176. 
183. Michelman, Possession, supra note 2, at 1330-31. 
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vailed. Early police power cases reflect the old and deep roots of prop-
erty's vulnerability to claims of the common good. 184 The 
development of the corporate form in the late nineteenth century pro-
duced a second kind of claim on politics - to curb the resulting un-
precedented aggregations of wealth and power. In order to justify 
invoking the power of the state in the private sphere, the Progressives 
had to and did reforge the link between politics and property, focusing 
this time on the political nature of nongovernmental power relation-
ships.185 Because the federal courts resisted some of the progressive 
incursions on property, only after the acceptance of the New Deal did 
the American political system largely accept the communal claims on 
private property.186 
B. The Poor 
The treatment of the poorest members of society, the actual pau-
pers, reflects the diversity of American attitudes toward property as 
well as its own brand of complexity. From the standpoint of formal 
citizenship, even as the franchise was broadened through taxpayer re-
quirements or, later, poll taxes, to include workers with a property in 
their labor rather than in capital, paupers were affirmatively and delib-
erately excluded from voting.187 Even the partial inclusion of the 
poorest Americans into the category of voters, if not citizens,188 really 
only took effect with the enactment of the Voting Rights Act twenty-
five years ago.189 Thus, at the extreme of pauperism,. the republican 
conflict between property and citizenship was, for a time at least, sub-
ject to an exclusionary solution not applied to anyone else. 190 
. 1. Relief 
Turning to the converse issue - the use of public resources to alle-
viate poverty - I am tempted to achieve academic immortality as the 
first scholar to write about paupers without opening with the quote 
184. Harry Scheiber, Property Law, Expropriation, and Resource Allocation by Government, 
1789-1910, in AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (1988) (summarizing the 
developments, many of which Scheiber drew together in other works). 
185. Michelman, Possession, supra note 2, at 1334-36. 
186. See Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Rediscovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 
1052-57 (1984); Nichol, Children of Distant Fathers; Sketching an Ethos of Constitutional Liberty, 
1985 Wis. L. REV. 1305, 1337. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, supra note 2, at 903. 
187. See Steinfeld, supra note 176, at 335-36. 
188. For a description of the distinction between citizenship and voting, see B. BARBER, 
supra note 2. But see K. KARST, .BELONGING TO AMERICA, supra note 2, at 93-94. 
189. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-l (1982)). 
190. See Michelman, Possession supra note 2, at 1331. 
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from Jesus ("The poor are always with us"). Here, however, it's not 
only the beginning, but probably the whole story. Certainly, the poor 
have always been with us. First, the capacity of mankind to provide 
has only recently, in historical time, begun to approach a level ade-
quate to sustain most people at some objective level of comfort, if not 
luxury. 191 Second, even if one limits one's self to a specific society, 
say, the United States, with adequate supplies, the political problem of 
redistribution to offset poverty is a devilishly tough one. Finally, as 
general supplies become more abundant, the idea of what constitutes 
poverty rises, so that even a society committed to raising its poorest 
members is chasing a moving target.192 
For a long time, the United States, like the rest of the world, was 
hemmed in by scarcity, so that the second and third problems were 
mostly hypothetical.193 People were poor; perhaps as many as half the 
people lived at a level of absolute poverty.194 When the poverty 
reached the level of pauperism, the towns offered alms houses, whose 
residents were expected to work for the town.195 With the ultimate 
reality of poverty largely beyond reach, the charitable donors were free 
to discriminate among recipients. The focus was traditionally some 
variation of moral worth - for the churches, spiritual, for the towns, 
that life on welfare should be "less eligible [less desirable] than life 
enhanced by work."196 
To a surprising extent, these attitudes survived well into the indus-
trial period, when the prospect of more generalized relief from poverty 
began to appear. The Progressives talked about environmental causes 
of poverty, but their prescriptions were largely directed not at alleviat-
ing the hardship directly, but, rather, at turning the poor into good 
members of the middle class by inculcating them with the work ethic. 
The movement toward providing pensions to mothers with dependent 
children - a world away from turning the women into workers197 -
still avoided confronting the prospect of simple relief by limiting the 
recipients to the "deserving" - largely widows, who would otherwise 
have been reduced to alms houses.19s 
One would have thought that the poverty of the Great Depression, 
191. J. PATIERSON, supra note 165, at 9-10, 15. 
192. Id. at 11-12. 
193. Id. at 15. 
194. See id. at 16. 
195. L. KOMISAR, supra note 165, at 10-11, 16-17. 
196. J. PATIERSON, supra note 165, at 20-21 n.4. 
197. Id. at 23. 
198. Id. at 27. 
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with its obviously structural causes, would have disabused the society 
of some of its moralistic approach to welfare. The combination of an 
external economic cause of hardship with some real productive capac-
ity to alleviate poverty might have produced a commitment to a mini-
mum standard of well-being simply associated with the rights of 
citizenship, an arrangement similar to the European model developed 
since the nineteenth century.199 
This did not happen, however. The New Deal brought at least 
three categories of welfare programs, but none of them reflected a 
commitment to eliminating or limiting poverty based simply on social 
membership. First, New Deal programs reflected a strong belief that 
the Depression was a temporary emergency; as a result, most policy 
attention was directed to its most dramatic manifestation, unemploy-
ment. 200 Second, even under the impact of a disastrous structural fail-
ure, American public opinion did not let go of the belief that property 
should be earned. Many of the programs contained a strong work 
element, however imperfectly realized.201 (This category includes 
many of the insurance programs, which are, at least in concept, only a 
redistribution within a cfass as a provision against imprudence. 202) 
Third, many of the New Deal reforms reflect a recognition that private 
property arrangements create power relationships with sufficient polit-
ical impact to compel recognition in the public sphere. Accordingly, 
the federal government began involving itself as a kind of broker 
among interests. 203 
After World War II, two important phenomena occurred. First, 
without any conscious effort or commitment in theory, the plight of 
the poor began to improve. 204 Analysts attribute the development to 
many sources: the existence of social security and the aging of the 
population made an enormous dent in the number of aged poor, a 
traditionally impoverished group; civil rights and other nonwelfare 
changes in attitudes greatly increased the knowledge and willingness 
of poor people to participate in what programs existed;205 "sleeper" 
programs like Medicaid turned out to be major vehicles for welfare; 
and a bureaucracy of welfare grew up, including· the Social Security 
199. Id. at 31. 
200. Id. at 41-43. 
201. See id. at 46-47 ("WPA," people said, stands for "We Piddle Around."); L. KOMISAR, 
supra note 165, at 53-56. 
202. L. KoMJSAR, supra note 165, at 60-61. 
203. The classic example of this is the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 
(1982). 
204. J. PATTERSON, supra note 165, at 160-62. 
205. L. KoMJSAR, supra note 165, at 92-93. 
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Administration and state and local officials pressing the federal gov-
ernment for more and more relief. 206 
The second phenomenon is incongruent: attitudes toward poverty 
and poor people changed almost not at all. The most overt - one 
might say the only overt - effort to address poverty as an evil in itself, 
the War on Poverty, was always a one-man show by Lyndon Johnson, 
acting out the populist fantasies of his youth in the wake of an aber-
rant electoral victory.207 Never funded at a level remotely related to its 
aspirations,208 the most that can be said for the Office of Economic 
Opportunity is that its cadres of Legal Services lawyers contributed to 
the development of a "welfare rights" mentality, which at least al-
lowed poor people to take advantage of the available, albeit piecemeal, 
relief.209 
But, the poor are always with us. (See, I told you so.) Conserva-
tives have attempted to address the problem with solutions consistent 
with traditional American rights-based individualism, solutions like 
reducing welfare payments to increase self-help210 or creating "enter-
prise zones."211 Milton Friedman, in a characteristically original as-
sault on the conventional wisdom, proposed years ago to redistribute a 
reasonable amount of American surplus in the most neutral possible 
form - negative income tax - but, the neo-Friedmanian Family 
Assistance Program went to legislative defeat after a battlethat one of 
its proponents characterized as like chasing the great white whale.212 
2. Rights 
The rights-based individualism - unassailably linked in the Amer-
ican debates about poverty to issues of race213 - that has character-
ized the public policy debate in the legislatures has also defeated 
efforts to address poverty issues in the courts as constitutional matters. 
As Professor Kenneth Karst has recently reminded us, the Burger and 
Rehnquist Courts have consistently fenced out any constitutional 
claim to relief from poverty under the equal protection clause of the 
fourteenth amendment, using traditional liberal pluralist concepts like 
206. J. PATIERSON, supra note 165, at 162-64, 169. 
207. Id. at 133-34 ("[W]hen Lyndon Johnson called for a 'war on poverty,' ... 83% of 
Americans thought poverty would never be done away with .... "). 
208. Id. at 141, 151-52. 
209. Id. at 153. 
210. C. MURRAY, LoSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY: 1950-1980, at 227-33 
(1984). 
211. Temann, The On'gins of the Underclass, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1986, at 54, 66-68. 
212. J. PATIERSON, supra note 165, at 194. 
213. Karst, supra note 23, at 4. 
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a strict division between public and private spheres, an assumption of 
governmental absence from market developments, demanding stan-
dards of causation, and, most powerfully, the slippery slope of the neu-
tral viewpoint.214 
Every Burger Court critic has a favorite candidate for the most 
poignant example of the Court's avoidance of the public implications 
of poverty;215 mine is the Supreme Court decision upholding the une-
qual local financing of public schools in San Antonio Independent 
School District v. Rodriguez. 216 At the time, I thought Rodriguez was 
the worst of a lengthening list of bad Supreme Court decisions. It 
seemed excessively mean of the Court to rub the plaintiffs' noses in it, 
when they were really backing down a lot, agreeing to settle for equal 
schools 100 years after Plessy. Not even equal really. The Rodriguez 
plaintiffs merely sought to abolish the disparities in school financing 
between school districts attributable to disparities in the value of the 
taxable property in the various districts.217 This most modest effort at 
equalization falls far short of the- provision, for instance, of equal edu-
cational product or minimum educational product, or even of equal 
expenditures per pupil.218 In any case, the Supreme Court by a vote of 
five to four rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the financing of education 
based on the taxable property in each school district violated the equal 
protection clause. 219 I now recognize that the Court was actually 
balking not at the reactionary return to the Plessy norm, but at a po-
tentially revolutionary development - addressing unequal distribu-
tion of the conditions of citizenship and in its most egregious form: 
through an unequal public distribution network. 
Plaintiffs' strategy of casting their radical claims in familiar rights 
terms - while perhaps the likeliest avenue to success at the time -
simply gave the majority the opportunity to disguise their rejection as 
214. Id. at 34-35. 
215. See, e.g., id. at 33 (citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)). 
216. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Just before this article went to press, I discovered that I was not the 
only claimant for that position. See Balkin, The Footnote, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 275, 307 (1989) 
("The process of doctrinal ossification [of equal protection theory] culminated in .•• San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez."). Professor Balkin attributes the outcome in Rodri-
guez in considerable part to the rigidity of doctrine originating in the famous footnote four of 
Carolene Products and its "ideology of democratic pluralism" which excluded consideration of 
economic relationships from politics. Id. at 309. It is the thesis of this article that it is rights 
analysis generally that produces this result. 
217. 411 U.S. at 47. 
218. Note, Strategies for School Finance Reform Litigation In the Post-Rodriguez Era, 21 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 817, 821-22 (1985-1986). All the Rodriguez plaintiffs sought to accomplish 
at the outset of this post-Brown era was "fiscal neutrality." Rodriguez v. San Antonio lndep. 
School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 283-84 (W.D. Tex. 1971), revd., 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
219. 411 U.S. at 23-24. 
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an equally innocuous application of equal protection doctrine.220 Di-
viding the inquiry into the categories of suspect classifications and fun-
damental rights, Justice Powell, writing for the Court, first categorized 
the classification in Rodriquez as pertaining not to poor or poorer peo-
ple, but simply to people residing in poorly endowed school dis-
tricts. 221 To accomplish this classification, he separated residency 
from income.222 Having separated the plaintiffs from a classification 
based on income, Justice Powell concluded that the classification 
lacked the indicia of suspectness: that is, the people affected by the 
classification had not been saddled with extraordinary disability or 
subjected to a history of purposeful discrimination.223 (One peculiar-
ity of the opinion is that, having failed to find a wealth-based classifica-
tion, the Court nonetheless added, apparently gratuitously, that the 
inability to pay becomes a constitutional disability only· where the 
claimant is completely cut off from the service.224) One would have 
thought that the degree of deprivation would have more ·to do with 
Justice Powell's ·rejection of education as fundamental, and tha~ posi-
tion appears in the opinion also. His starting place was the assertion 
that the right must be explicit or implicit in the Constitution. Noting 
that the plaintiffs failed to allege education inadequate to exercise ex-
plicit first amendment or voting rights, he assumed that the claim to 
fundamental status rested solely on the importance of education,225 
and, based on the Court's recent rejection of other welfare claims such 
as housing, he easily concluded that education makes no better claim 
of importance and therefore must also be rejected. 
The decision elicited a scathing opinion from Justice Marshall.226 
220. Neuman, Te"itorial Discrimination, Equal Protection, and Self-Determination, 135 U. 
PA. L. REV. 261, 279 (1987). 
221. 411 U.S. at 19-20. 
222. There is some question about the Court's analysis of the facts, which rests on a record 
reflecting heavy concentrations of extremely poor in the poorest endowed districts and extremely 
rich in the best endowed districts, with less congruence between family income and district 
wealth in the middle. 411 U.S. at 26-27. First, the facts in Rodriguez, as most urban economic 
studies reflect, do demonstrate some congruence between family income and school district fi-
nancing. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMN. ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN 
CITY 413-14 (1969). Neither precedent nor sense supports the contention that a governmental 
division must follow a suspect classification with mathematical precision to raise fourteenth 
amendment concerns. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974); General Elec. v. 
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 133-40 (1976); 429 U.S. at 161 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Regan, Rewrit-
ing Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1621-34 (1979). Under a less than foursquare analy-
sis, one might say that a legislative scheme of local school financing which, on the whole, falls 
more heavily on the poor, violates the equal protection clause. 
223. 411 U.S. at 28. 
224. 411 U.S. at 20-21. 
225. 411 U.S. at 30-37. 
226. 411 U.S. at 70 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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Numerous state courts have exercised their federalism option and cho-
sen to disagree with the Court, resting their holdings compelling some 
equalization of education funding on a reading of their state constitu-
tions. 227 More numerous commentators have criticized Rodriguez for 
everything from bad theory to bad morals.228 But Rodriguez is actu-
ally nothing more or less than a forthright acknowledgment of the role 
of extreme individualism in American public life. Obviously, the com-
plete absence of public education would be a more graphic example. 
But, given the income-based mobility among widely differing local 
school districts,229 local financing encourages, if it does not actually 
produce, something resembling a private school system (with the 
kicker of federal tax deductibility for local taxes).230 
As will be set forth more fully below,231 the state court decisions to 
equalize school funding as a matter of state constitutional law suggest 
a very different vision of the common life, at least in some communi-
ties. But on a national level, the background understandings remain in 
the Lockean tradition: distribution of wealth is natural and can only 
be upset by claims of right from the beneficiaries; such legitimate 
claims are minimal.232 The Court's decision in 'Rodriguez demon-
strates that, in this Lockean context, where most extremes of wealth 
and poverty with all their attendant social consequences are accepted 
as normal, 233 theories of equal protection will never fuel an evolution 
to a different kind of community. 
227. See Dupree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark. 340, 651 S.W.2d 90 (1983); Horton 
v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1976); Rose y. Council for Better Educ., 1989 Ky. 
LEXIS 55; Helena Elementary School Dist. v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989), modified, 784 
P.2d 412 (1990); Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W. 2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Seattle 
School Dist. No. I v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 
(W. Va. 1979); Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976); Washakie Co. School 
Dist. No. One v. Herschl.er, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.), cert denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980). 
228. Inman & Rubinfeld, The Judicial Pursuit of Local Fiscal Equity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 
1662 (1979); Neuman, Territorial Discrimination, Equal Protection, and Self-Determination, 135 
U. PA. L. REV. 261 (1987); Richards, Equal Opportunity and School Financing: Towards a 
Moral Theory of Constitutional Adjudication, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 32 (1973); Note, Student Fees 
in Public Schools: Defining the Scope of Education, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1401 (1987); Comment, 
Human Rights and Basic Needs: Using International Human Rights Norms to Inform Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1195 (1987); Comment, Inequality in Louisiana Public 
School Finance: Should Educational Quality Depend on a Student's School District Residency?, 
60 TuL. L. REv. 1269 (1986); Note, supra note 218, at 817. 
229. See generally Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 228. 
230. Coleman, Foreword to J. COONS, w. CLUNE & s. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND 
PUBLIC EDUCATION at vii (1970). 
231. See infra notes 273-278 and accompanying text. 
232. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text. 
233. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, supra note 2, at 903-10. 
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3. The Underclass 
While the legislatures and federal courts were pursuing their indi-
vidualist, rights-oriented course, social scientists discovered the per-
manent underclass, a subculture of poverty, suspiciously congruent 
with concentrations of black Americans in the urban ghettos, and im-
pervious to changes in the economic structure. 234 Cut off from tradi-
tional entry level jobs by the flight of manufacturing from urban 
centers,235 allegedly abandoned by the black middle and stable work-
ing class,236 the underclass that remains is in a state of near total de-
struction237 and social isolation. 238 Many unhappy political 
implications arise from the existence of the underclass; the worst are 
the perpetuation of poverty from one generation to the next239 and the 
persistent departure of behavior from middle class norms.240 
Even before the social scientists gave the problem a name, rights-
oriented constitutional scholars had offered variations on the four-
teenth amendment theme as ·attempts to alleviate the condition of the 
underclass. 241 The earliest approach was Frank Michelman's effort to 
apply variants of Rawls' A Theory of Justice to establish a theory of 
minimum welfare: that the equal protection clause requires the gov-
ernment to protect the poor against the most extreme hazards of their 
impoverishment. Following Rawls' general approach, Michelman 
asks what people behind the veil of ignorance would risk being unable 
to afford. The answer identifies the category of goods Michelman 
would remove from the market and subject to an equality-based polit-
ical allocation. Clever as this effort is in sidestepping the slippery 
slope and state action limits on the equal protection clause, it does, 
however, raise serious objections of inconsistency with both text and 
history.242 Moreover, as set forth above, twenty more years of living 
with A Theory of Justice has revealed that Rawls' approach to distribu-
tive justice does not entirely avoid the problem of the slippery slide 
into excessive heroism either.243 
Kenneth Karst has come closer to both text and history of the 
234. See supra note 172. 
235. Wilson, supra note 172, at 11-12. 
236. Id. at 7. 
237. Id. at 21. 
238. Id. at 20-21. 
239. Karst, supra note 23,·at 4 & n.10. 
240. Id. at 17. 
241. Edelman, supra note 23; Karst, Equal Citizenship, supra note 2; Michelman, supra note 
23. 
242. Michelman, supra note 23, at 13. 
243. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text. 
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fourteenth amendment in his "principle of equal citizenship," which 
forbids society from excluding individuals or groups as respected, re-
sponsible, and participating members of the community.244 Karst's 
principle requires tliat the society, including the judiciary acting under 
the fourteenth amendment, intervene "to foster the inclusion of the 
marginalized poor . . . as equal citizens. "245 Karst's test for judicial 
action would inquire whether judges have "reason to believe that the 
government would have filled the need if the decision makers had re-
garded the claimant not as part of an outsider group but as a full mem-
ber of the society."246 
But, as liberal legal scholarship critics Collins and Skover re-
mirided us, Earl Warren is dead, and the post-Warren Court is not far 
short of a generation old. As Karst freely acknowledges, the current 
Supreme Court likely will continue to reject claims to constitutional 
relief for marginalization through poverty.247 And, although one does 
not reject a political philosophy simply because of a few election re-
turns, the failure of American liberal pluralism under any theory to 
redress decidedly undesirable developments like the underclass should 
certainly raise some doubts. 
The answer lies, I think, in the crabbed interpretation of human 
possibilities that has monopolized modem thinking. Left with little 
more than self-interest as a guide to social justice, the best solution the 
liberals have been able to come up with is to blind each founder of a 
hypothetical regime to which selfish individual he or she will be.248 
Worse still, demonstrating the communitarians' vaunted human ca-
pacity to ignore hypothetical constructs, the governors of American 
society249 have recognized themselves as the Qargely middle class, 
white, male) persons250 they are and have simply cast the underclass 
.into the role of the other - a group of strangers who have no claims 
on the regime. Thus, value neutral pluralism and value neutral com-
munitarianism have produced the identical outcome. It looks like the 
character of the citizenry is a costly matter to ignore. 
244. Karst, supra note 23, at 1-2; Karst, Equal Citizenship. supra note 2, at 5. 
245. Karst, supra note 23, at 18. 
246. Id. at 42. 
247. Id. at 38. The Court's recent decision in Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990), 
affirming the authority of a federal judge to order local taxes to remedy school segregation, does 
not indicate any weakening in the Court's rejection of constitutional claims beyond the four-
teenth amendment's well established prohibition of official racial discrimination. 
248. This is, of course, the central tenet of Rawls' A Theory of Justice, and the focal point of 
communitarian criticism. J. RAWLS, supra note 4. A. MACINTYRE, supra note 2; M. SANDEL, 
supra note 2. 
249. See supra note 169 for definition of governing body. 
250. Karst, supra note 23, at 25-26, 34. 
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C. The Liberality Solution 
Recognizing the role of the virtue of liberality in the American 
regime is the first step toward abandoning unproductive rights-based 
individualism. Although theory can only suggest what politics should 
do, sharpening the focus on the communal and virtuous aspects of 
public policymaking does seem to compel some consideration of the 
details of such an enterprise. For example, in the United States, there 
are several candidates for the active role in any public agenda. Most 
remote from the private citizen is the life-tenured federal judiciary. 
Public policy also comes from the federal legislature and its (putative) 
servant, the administrative state. For most of American history, much 
social responsibility lay with the state and local governments.251 The 
state courts have until recently played a lesser role, but those times 
seem to be ending.252 Finally, action from virtue in whole or in part 
might come from the private sector. 
Taking the last position first, as between the government and the 
not-government, two lines of argument predominate. The first argu-
ment holds that, if the state coerces the behavior, it's not virtue. As 
classicist Terence Irwin puts it: "Even if the result of private generos-
ity is the very same as the result that the wise legislator would pre-
scribe, the fact that it results from the private generosity of many is a 
further good feature of it that is lost if the result is produced by legisla-
tion. "253 Liberality, by this reading, would be strictly limited to vol-
untary charity. Depending on whom you read, Americans either give 
generously when the redistributive state does not get in the way254 or 
give in depressingly small amounts.255 The second argument against 
public liberality is, of course, that even if it could lead the citizenry to 
virtue through legislation, the state has no business inculcating virtue. 
Each of these arguments rests on the essentially modern view of 
the state as existing simply to preserve the physical well-being of im-
mutably separate human actors. Despite his real insight into the es-
251. J. PATIERSON, supra note 165, at 29-31. 
. 252. See, e.g., Rose v. The Council for Better Educ. Inc., 1989 Ky. LEXIS 55 (state school 
financing system held unconstitutional); Helena Elementary School Dist. v. State, 769 P.2d 684 
(Mont. 1989), modified 784 P.2d 412 (1990) (same); Edgewood lndep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 
S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989) (same); cf Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township qf Mt. 
Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983) (each municipality must take its fair share of regional 
growth including low and moderate income housing). 
253. Irwin, supra note 88, at 45. 
254. C. MURRAY, IN PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS AND GOOD GOVERNMENT 277 (1988). 
255. See INDEPENDENT SECTOR, GIVING AND VQLUNTEERING IN THE UNITEP STATES: 
FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY 1 (1988) (average contribution to all charities was 1.5% 
of annual. household income). · 
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cape from altruism,256 ultimately this seems to be Feinberg's 
position. 257 (In his ability to separate personal from public virtue, he 
thus remains essentially modern.) As set forth above, the classical 
concept of the polity - as cultivating and resting on human excellence 
- is far from the modern view. In a classical republic, virtue was 
both the end and the foundation of the good public order. Classical 
political philosophy recognizes that law has a role in providing the 
occasion for virtue.258 This function takes two forms: educating the 
young and habituating the society to virtuous behavior. Insofar as the 
civic republican revival has traced a continuous thread of concern 
with such virtue, both private and public, to the American founding, 
the assumption that American politics is devoid of such concerns sim-
ply does not stand up.259 
Moreover, even without definitive evidence from history, the criti-
cal issue is not whether virtue may play a role in the formulation of 
public policy, but whether constitutional, political, or moral concerns 
preclude any particular action. Here, as in the virtue/autonomy de-
bate set forth above,260 one must return to context. As far as liberality 
is concerned, I think, the answer is relatively easy. At least since the 
Progressive Era, and certainly since the New Deal, the American re-
gime has included acceptance of the public construction and regula-
tion of property.261 Even in the redistributive models necessary to 
address the underclass, considerations of confiscatory taking or cross-
ing the boundary between minimum necessary security and equality of 
property would not be pressing. That government regulation of prop-
erty also fulfills public and personal virtue certainly should not invali-
date otherwise legitimate action. 
Moreover, although classical philosophy treats personal virtue as 
an end in itself, 262 the Politics repeatedly remarks on the role of virtue 
in promoting the value of social order. Thus, in his discussion of prop-
erty, Aristotle emphasizes the ends of a moderate and private distribu-
256. See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text. 
257. J. FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING (1988) (THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMI· 
NAL LAW vol. 4). 
258. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text. 
259. See supra note 2. 
260. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
261. See, e.g., Hale, Force and the State: A Comparison of "Political" and "Economic" Com-
pulsion, 35 CoLUM. L. REV. 149 (1935); Karst, supra note 23, at 22 (citing Cohen, Property and 
Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927)); Parrish, The Great Depression, The New Deal, and the 
American Legal Order, in AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER, supra note 184, 
at 377. 
262. See generally ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, supra note 16. 
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tion: social peace263 and industry.264 In describing the desirability of 
a moderate distribution of property as an actual constitution, Aristotle 
again emphasizes avoiding the anti-social extremes of contempt among 
the rich and envy among the poor. 265 Under the classical construc-
tion, then, liberality, a virtue directed at achieving the best life for 
individuals and societies, does not require a mortal threat to the social 
order before actions may be characterized as directed to the common 
interest. 
The role of law in inculcating virtue is the main answer to Irwin's 
argument that governmental redistribution robs liberality of its virtue. 
But, in addition, in a society governed by representative institutions, 
the distinction between the governors and the governed is blurred, and 
Irwin's "wise legislator" simply cannot be separated cleanly from the 
property-owners she represents. Thus, if the initial act of liberality 
takes the form of legislation, the processes of majoritarianism, how-
ever blurred, replicate for the society the self-governance represented 
by the virtues. 
For this reason, Congress, not the judiciary, is the preferred instru-
mentality for implementation. In this, then, I dissent from the civic 
republican infatuation with the insularity of the governors.266 Life 
tenure plays a valuable role in the scheme, of course,267 but the post-
New Deal elevation of the judiciary to rabbinic status may have had a 
hand in relieving the rest of us from our role as the people of the book. 
The second reason for preferring the legislature is a prudential one. 
Taking affirmative steps, even the very modest ones I suggest, involves 
social and political judgments of some sensitivity, judgments that can 
be, and sometimes are, tempered and refined in the legislative pro-
cess.268 Finally,- as set forth above, the liberality solution sidesteps the 
floodgates claims of perfectjustice,269 and legislation, not judicial deci-
sionmaking, has traditionally provided the solutions of partial and im-
perfect justice. This assignment of responsibility has stood up fairly 
well over time. 270 
263. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, supra note 39, at 49. 
264. Id. 
265. Id. at 181. 
266. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text. 
267. Hirshman, Bronte; Bloom and Bork, supra note 8, at 193. 
268. See Collins & Skover, supra note 3, at 201; Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party 
Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1567 (1988); 
Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 97 (1988). 
269. See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text. 
270. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (Maryland legislature not 
obliged to "choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at 
all."). 
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As between the states or municipalities on one hand and the fed-
eral government on the other, the choice is not so obvious. Local gov-
ernment has the longest history of providing for the citizens' well-
being, 211 and there are long-standing arguments in favor of small com-
munities as repositories of republican values.272 As set forth above, 
since the Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez, several state courts 
have found rights to equal education funding in state constitutions,273 
and three such opinions, issued just within the past year, hold out 
some promise for the states as· repositories of civic virtue.274 This 
promise rests more on the rhetoric than on the holdings in the cases, 
since the issues in this article are much broader than the outcome in 
Rodriguez, and each of the three decisions rests on state constitutional 
language quite different from the language of the equal protection 
clause.275 
Nonetheless, even if treated only as pieces of political rhetoric, the 
opinions from the state courts articulate a vision of a common political 
life far superior to the impoverished vision of the federal decision.216 
Thus, in Rose, the Kentucky Supreme Court quoted at length from the 
debates over the framing of the Kentucky provision: 
If public schools have come to stay, if they are a part and parcel of our 
free institutions, woven into the very web and woof of popular govern-
ment; and if they are in the future to be the dependence of the people of 
Kentucky for the instruction of their youth, what is the logic of the situ-
ation? Manifestly to encourage and improve them, ... in so far as we 
love our children[,] to try to make their training-places fit nurseries of 
immortal spirits that have divine purposes to fulfill on earth, and cannot 
hope to succeed, unless their intellectual powers be properly 
developed. 277 
271. J. PATIERSON, supra note 16S, at 29-30. 
272. See Pangle, Justice and Legal Education, 39 J. LEGAL Eouc. 1S7, 161 (1989) ("[T]he 
republican culture of ancient Athens, like that of ancient Rome, of the medieval Italian cities ••• 
was much more tight-knit, more censorious and intolerant, and also more communitarian than 
our political system."). 
273. See supra note 227. 
274. See Helena Elementary School Dist. v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Edgewood 
Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W. 2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Rose v. The Council for Better Educ. 
Inc., 1989 Ky. LEXIS SS. 
27S. The Texas Constitution requires an "efficient" system of public education to provide for 
"general diffusion of knowledge." VERNON'S ANN. TEXAS CONST. art. 7, § 1. The Kentucky 
Constitution requires "the General Assembly ... [to] provide for an efficient system of common 
schools throughout the State." KY. CONST. § 183. Under Montana's Constitution "[e]quality of 
educational opportunity is guaranteed to each person of the state." MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1, 
cl. I. 
276. See Helena Elementary School Dist. v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Edgewood 
Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W. 2d 391 (Tex: 1989); Rose v. The Council for Better Educ. 
Inc., 1989 Ky. LEXIS SS. 
277. Rose, 1989 Ky. LEXIS SS. Similarly, in Edgewood, the Texas Court quoted one of the 
framers of the Texas Constitution: "I boldly assert that [education] is for the general welfare of 
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Moreover, each of the state education funding decisions sidesteps 
the institutional competence issue by entering into the now familiar 
pattern of give and take with the legislature, delaying the effective date 
of the decision about the problem to allow the legislature to address 
the specifics of the solution. 278 
Accordingly, nothing in my preferred solution should be taken to 
preempt a state level initiative, but several factors indicate that the 
states are not the first avenues of attack. First, the level of governmen-
tal action should reflect the reality of the American economy and soci-
ety. Arguably since the ratification of the Constitution, and certainly 
since the New Deal,279 essential aspects of American economy have 
been subject to national regulation.280 With the New Deal, social ser-
vice, harnessed to the power of the federal income tax, became cen-
tered in the federal govemment.281 Finally, the Supreme Court 
decision in Shapiro v. Thompson, 282 striking down residency require-
ments on welfare as violative of the constitutional right to travel, put 
the constitutional seal on what had become socially apparent long 
before: America could not draw state lines around the underclass. 
Conversely, the federal union retains the power to exclude people 
from its political borders, including for economic reasons,283 and the 
power to control its economic business, insofar as economic arrange-
ments are ever subject to definitive political governance. 284 Accord-
ingly, since both the taxation/redistribution machinery and the 
community of potential recipients are national, it seems counterintui-
tive to break up any public policy suggestions by states. Finally, and 
most importantly, although liberality is not hung up on the free rider 
problem, the goal of inculcating virtue through public life will be 
weakened if citizens can escape by moving to another location within 
the polity.285 
all, rich and poor, male and female, that the means of a common school education should, if 
possible, be placed within the reach of every child in the State." Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 395. 
278. See cases cited supra note 227. 
279. Parrish, supra note 261, at 380-83. 
280. Id. at 379. 
281. Id. at 379. 
282. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
283. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (Congress has authority "to establish an uniform [r]ule of 
[n]aturalization"). See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. l, 10 (1977) (naturalization is an exclu-
sively federal concern). 
284. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Congress has authority "to regulate commerce with for-
eign [n]ations"). See also Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (states may not regulate 
foreign commerce); Trustees of the Univ. of III. v. United States, 389 U.S. 48 (1939). 
285. See Landes & Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Resources: An Eco-
nomic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1978) (discussion of the circumstances 
most likely to stimulate rescue behavior). 
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In addition to addressing the supply side of liberality, no public 
policy analysis would be complete without exploring the other half of 
the virtue: the moral and intellectual judgment about recipients. 
Throughout this article, I have linked the failure of liberality in the 
American regime with the continued presence of the underclass. One 
might, however, unpack the two phenomena, concluding, for instance, 
that the virtue of liberality should be pursued for its benefit to the 
giver, but that the distribution should be directed at any of a myriad of 
other social projects. 
Classical political philosophy supplies at least two arguments in 
favor of choosing to address the underclass. First, classical philosophy 
asserts - and, as set forth above, this is a significant difference be-
tween ancient and modern theory286 - three premises: the individual 
has the capacity for practicing virtue, the society needs virtuous citi-
zens, and the society must provide tJie occasions for virtue. In Book I 
of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle states the premises: the good in 
life is related to the function of the actor;287 the function of humans 
apart from all other creatures is the activity of the soul in conformance 
with reason;288 anyone not maimed in personal potentiality for virtue 
may win it by study and care.289 Finally, and significantly for this part 
of the inquiry, Aristotle teaches that the exercise of virtue may require 
external goods, like friends and riches and political power as instru-
ments. 290 In the Politlcs, Aristotle links the exercise of virtue to the 
health of the state.29 1 Man is political; the virtues have value in large 
measure because they are also the excellences of character which pro-
mote social life. 
What does all this mean for the allocation to the underclass of the 
liberal person's wealth? The answer should be relatively clear. If vir-
tue is of value, allowing people the means to become virtuous has the 
same value. Moreover, in a political society, the virtue of the people 
comprises the quality of the society. One option in political society is, 
of course, to exclude the people who, through maimed souls or a lack 
of external goods, have not demonstrated a capacity for virtue.292 
286. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text. 
287. ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, supra note 16, at 12-13. 
288. Id. at 13-14. 
289. Id. at 18. 
290. Id. at 17. 
291. See supra notes 68 and accompanying text. 
292. This was a very real possibility to Aristotle; perhaps the greatest barrier to Aristotelian 
political philosophy in the modem world is his easy acceptance of human slavery as a natural 
condition of life. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, supra note 39, at 11-12, 104, 111-12, 306. But see S. 
OKIN, supra note 15. 
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Here, I think, is the role of Kenneth Karst's principle of equal citizen-
ship. Given the fourteenth amendment and the various Supreme 
Court decisions and civil rights statutes of the last generation, the so-
lution of excluding the underclass from American political life is sim-
ply not available. Whether they vote in reasonable numbers or not,293 
in a political society in which the right to vote is the mark of political 
belonging,294 the underclass remains part of the political society.295 In 
this construct, the cultural, geographical, gender and racial divisions, 
which have supported the continuing marginalization of the under-
class from society defined other than politically,296 do not apply. 
Moreover, as the social science literature reflects more exigently each 
da)'., every urban society in the country is affected by the danger and 
dis.affection of the lives of the underclass.297 Under these circum-
stances, considerations of individual virtue and of the quality of the 
communal life strongly support the judgment to distribute the wealth 
that liberality produces to address the problem of the underclass. 
Assuming that federal legislation directed at tlie underclass were to 
be the vehicle for change, what might guide the actual choice of solu-
tions? One answer might lie in the surprising resiliency of the concept 
of decent minimum education even in face of the Supreme Court's 
decision in Rodriguez. The roots of such a concept are deep: when the 
Framers were most engaged in how they would govern their new 
lands, they provided, in the Northwest Ordinance, that land be set 
aside for local school construction. 298 During Reconstruction, serious 
debate focused on the possibility of providing federal education to the 
newly emancipated slaves. 29 9 By the end of the nineteenth century, 
almost every state constitution included a commitment to public edu-
cation, and over half the constitutions required it to be free.300 Since 
293. See generally E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST'S 
VIEW OF DEMOCRAC_Y IN AMERICA 97-113 (1960); K. SHIENBAUM, BEYOND THE ELECTORAL 
CONNECTION: A REASSESSMENT OF THE ROLE OF VOTING IN CoNTEMPORARY AMERICAN 
POLITICS (1984). 
294. K. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA, supra note 2, at 35-36. 
295. In this, the members of the underclass are like Aristotle's citizens who have a claim to 
office, whether or not they give it away. See M. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS 349 
(1986). 
296. See supra note 247 and accompanying text. 
297. See supra note 172. 
298. M. YUDOF, D. KIRP, T. VAN GEEL & B. LEVIN, EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE 
LAW 566 (2d ed. 1982). 
299. W. WIECEK, supra note 171, at 185-86. 
300. Note, Student Fees in Public Schools: Defining the Scope of Education, 72 low A L. 
REV. 1401, 1402 n.16 (1987) (citing constitutions that require some form of public education: 
ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 256, amend. CXI; ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, 
§ 6; HAW. CONST.·art. x, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. IX,§ 3; KY. CONST.§ 183; LA. CONST. art. 
VIII,§ 1; ME. CONST. art. VIII, pt. 1, § l; MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 5, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. 
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the decision in Rodriguez, numerous state courts have expanded the 
access to education under state constitutions in decisions striking 
down or limiting the imposition of fees for school-related activities and 
imposing various levels of funding equalizers.301 Commentators have 
suggested that the Supreme Court's decision be reconsidered on the 
coattails of a softening of the levels of eqyal protection theory, 302 as an 
example of applying international human rights to illuminate funda-
mental constitutional claims, 303 or as an aspect of incorporating 
Rawls' theory of equality of opportunity into the fourteenth 
amendm~nt. 304 
Even if such a rethinking of equal protection were practical, each 
XIII, § l; NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 2; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 83; OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2; OR. 
CONST. art. VIII, § 3; PA. CONST. art. III, § 14; R.I. CONST. art. XII, § l; UTAH CONST. art. x, 
§ l; VT. CONST. ch. II, § 68; w ASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2; Wvo. CONST. art. VII, § 1, § 9; and 
citing constitutions that require free public education: ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § l; CAL. CONST. 
art. IX, § 5; COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2; CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § l; DEL. CONST. art. x, § l; 
FLA. CONST. art. IX, § l; GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1, ff l; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § l; ILL. 
CONST. art. x, § l; IND. CONST. art. VIII, § l; KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 1, § 6(b); Mo. CONST. 
art. VIII, § l; MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; Miss. CONST. art. VIII, § 201; Mo. CONST. art. IX, 
§ l(a); MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1(3); NEB. CONST. art. VII, § l; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, ff l; 
N.M. CoNST. art. XII, § l; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § l; N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2(1); N.D. CONST. 
art. VIII,§ 2; OKLA. CONST. art. XIII,§ l; S.C. CoNST. art. XI,§ 3; S.D. CONST. art. VIII,§ l; 
TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12; TEX. CONST. art. VII, § l; VA. CONST. art. VIII, § l; W.VA. 
CONST. art. XII, § l; WIS. CONST. art. x, § 3). 
301. Hartzell v. Connell, 35 Cal. 3d 899, 911, 679 P.2d 35, 43, 201 Cal. Rptr. 601, 609 (1984) 
(imposition of fees violates constitutional guarantee); Beck v. Board of Educ., 63 III. 2d 10, 15-
16, 344 N.E.2d 440, 442 (1976) (financially able children must pay fees); Chandler v. South Bend 
Community School Corp., 160 Ind. App. 592, 597-98, 312 N.E.2d 915, 918 (1974) (fee waiver 
makes book fees constitutional); Bond v. Public Schools of Ann Arbor School Dist., 383 Mich. 
693, 700-02, 178 N.W.2d 484, 487-88 (1970) (books and school supplies essential part of free 
education); Attorney Gen. v. East Jackson Pub. Schools, 143 Mich. App. 634, 637, 372 N.W.2d 
638, 639-40 (1985) (nonessential activities can require fee if it can be waived by students who 
cannot afford to pay); Concerned Parents v. Caruthersville School Dist. 18, 548 S.W.2d 554, 561 
(Mo. 1977) (course fees are unconstitutional); Granger v. Cascade County School Dist. No. 1, 
159 Mont. 516, 527-29, 499 P.2d 780, 786 (1972); Norton v. Board of Educ., 89 N.M. 470, 471· 
72, 553 P.2d 1277, 1278-79 (1976) (all required courses must be free); Vandevender v. Cassell, 
158 W. Va. 87, 93-94, 208 S.E.2d 436, 439-40 (1974) (concurring opinion) (materials must be 
provided free of charge to needy students); Sneed v. Greensboro City Bd. of Educ., 299 N.C. 609, 
617-1~, 264 S.E.2d 106, 112-14 (1980) (appropriate fee waiver is constitutional right of indigent 
children); Board of Educ. v. Sinclair, 65 Wis. 2d 179, 187, 222 N.W.2d 143, 147-48 (1974) (fees 
constitutional if statutes provide waiver for indigents); see also cases cited supra note 227; cf. 
Parsippany-Troy Hills Educ. Assn. v. Board of Educ., 188 N.J. Super. 161, 169-70, 457 A.2d 15, 
20 (App. Div. 1983) (fee may be charged for nonessential course); Marshall v. School Dist. Re 
No. 3 Morgan County, 191 Colo. 451, 453-54, 553 P.2d 784, 785-86 (1976) (no constitutional 
duty to furnish nonindigent children books without cost). But see Carpio v. Tucson High School 
Dist. No. 1, 111 Ariz. 127, 128-29, 524 P.2d 948, 949-50 (1974) ("as nearly free as possible" gives 
legislature discretion), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 982 (1975). 
302. This projection rests largely on the Supreme Court decision in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 
202 (1982), striking down a Texas law refusing to fund public education for the children of 
undocumented aliens. However commendable the results in Plyler. the opinion does not even 
hint at reconsidering the class issue at the heart of Rodriguez. 
303. Comment, Human Rights and Basic Needs: Using International Human Rights Norms 
to Inform Constitutional Interpretation, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1195 (1987). 
304. Richards, supra note 228, at 52. 
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of these solutions suffers most visibly from the perfectionist defects of 
righ~s analysis. Even assuming, as any city-dweller intuits to be the 
case, that household poverty and school district poverty overlap, they 
do so imperfectly.305 So, redistributing from the wealthier school dis-
tricts to the poorer ones is an imperfect way to address the problems of 
poverty, if that is one's underlying goal. On the level of simple equal-
ity of opportunity, for years the debate over education has been dog-
ged by the social science data that pricier schools, divorced from other 
social factors like families and neighborhood, do not improve chil-
dren's fates at all. 306 Yet despite all of these flaws, access to meaning-
ful education makes a claim on the sensibility of the American 
community that refuses to vanish. It is a need with immense implica-
tions for the community to which perfect solutions are rare. For all of 
these reasons, education is the paradigm case for replacement of rights 
analysis with the exercise of the virtue of liberality. 
Although detailed public policy prescriptions are beyond the scope 
of this article, it probably pays to digress here for a moment to de-
scribe the Perry Preschool Study.307 In the study, the High/Scope 
Foundation of Ypsilanti, Michigan, followed the progress of 123 black 
children from poor families who had been randomly assigned to attend 
preschool or not to attend preschool in the sixties. The preschool pro-
gram consisted of 2 1/i hours per day five days per week, plus a 1 1/2 
hour per week home visit, 7 1/2 months per year for two years. 308 (As 
of the latest study, the children were nineteen. 309) The High/Scope 
staff studied school records, police and court records, records of social 
service use, and interviewed almost 100 of the participants. 310 
The results are compelling. Sixty-seven percent of the preschoolers 
graduated from high school; only forty-nine percent of the control 
group did.311 Fifty percent of the preschoolers were working at the 
time of the interview; only thirty-two percent of the control. group 
were.312 Looking at undesirable life events, thirty-one percent of the 
preschoolers had at one time been ilITested, while fifty-one percent of 
305. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 15 (1973). 
306. J. COLEMAN, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966). 
307. J. BERRURTA, L. SCHWEINHART, W. BARNEIT, A. EPSTEIN & D. WEJKART, 
CHANGED LIVES (Monograph of the High/Scope Educational Research Foundation No. Eight, 
1984) [hereinafter CHANGED LIVES]. ' ' 
308. Id. at 8. 
309. Id. at xiv. 
310. Id. at 5-12. 
311. Id. at 31 (Table 8). 
312. Id. at 47 (Table 12). 
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the control group had.313 Female preschoolers had 49 teen 
pregnancies per 100; control group females had 64 per 100.314 More-
over, and contrary to the now pretty completely discredited early neg-
ative evaluations of Head Start,315 the latest Perry study reveals that, 
where data were kept, seven studies from communities across the 
country support the Perry findings of intellectual performance, avoid-
ance of special education, and preventing dropout, along with mixed 
evidence of increased scholastic achievement.316 A society composed 
of graduates of the Perry Preschool Program, half unemployed, thirty 
percent with arrest records, many pregnant in their teens, may not be 
Allan Bloom's notion of the civic republic,317 but it sure beats the 
altemative.318 
Any consideration of specific social science remedies must also in-
clude the extraordinarily comprehensive recent study by the American 
Academy of Political and Social Sciences, The Ghetto Underclass: So-
cial Science Perspectives. 319 Although the volume includes a number 
of serious and provocative essays suggesting policy initiatives ranging 
from computer job opportunity networks to housing vouchers, Jen-
nifer Hochschild's essay, "Equal Opportunity and the Estranged 
Poor,"320 speaks most frankly of the political realities that produced 
and ignore the underclass and of how to address them. 
Hochschild first reminds the reader that "[m]uch of American his-
tory can be read as a set of political choices that created and consoli-
dated racial, ethnic, and gender disparities in wealth and power."321 
After a period of political decisions aimed at "opening channels of 
opportunity"322 during the 1950s and 1960s, Americans made an "ap-
parent rightward move";323 the real value of AFDC declined by 27% 
between 1970 and 1983, while between 1979 and 1985, "the annual 
median family income for the poorest 40 percent of the population 
declined $918 (in constant 1986 dollars) whereas the wealthiest 40 per-
cent of families gained $2775, and the wealthiest 10 percent gained 
313. Id. at 64 (Table 19). 
314. Id. at 2 (Table 1). 
315. See G. STEINER, THE CHILDREN'S CAUSE 32-35 (1976) (describing early studies critical 
of Head Start programs). 
316. CHANGED LIVES, supra note 307, at 95-105. 
317. See A. BLOOM, supra note 52. 
318. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 172, at 346-48. 
319. 501 ANNALS, supra note 172. 
320. Hochschild, Equal Opportunity and the Estranged Poor. in id. at 143. 
321. Id. at 146. 
322. Id. 
323. Id. 
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$6369."324 Hochschild's main point is this: "Political choices ranging 
from slavery to a preference for unemployment over inflation in the 
context of a particular ideological framework helped to create a group 
of people with no resources, no skills, and no faith."325 
Hochschild's essay is a prescription, not a condemnation, and 
therein lies its interest. As she puts it, "despite controversy over what 
the underclass is and whether and why it is growing, analysts surpris-
ingly concur on what to do about it."326 Each of the three programs 
she describes includes an element addressing a discrete problem -
joblessness, teen pregnancy, or high school dropout - but also in-
cludes a broad range of social efforts to provide the kind of "care that 
is as multidimensional as the care that's supposed to come from one's 
own family."327 As Hochschild sums up her findings, "[t]he common 
thread in these disparate programs and analyses is that successful ef-
forts to aid the estranged poor cost a lot, last a long time, and involve a 
wide array of activities aimed at changing skills, views, and life 
circumstances. "328 
Having thus frankly acknowledged the investment, Hochschild 
also admits that her suggestions will never produce the returns associ-
ated with perfectionism: 
Some analysts argue that [remedial] programs "not only improve the 
lives of participa[nts] but 'save public moneys as well' " .... 
Other analysts are less sanguine about both the ratio of financial ben-
efits to costs and the long-term social benefits of these programs. But the 
question is not whether these programs are as successful as we would 
like - they are not - or as successful as many programs that serve a 
less disadvantaged population - they are not. The issue is whether 
Americans are willing to let some fellow citizens destroy their own and 
others' lives without using the available knowledge to stop some of the 
destruction. 329 
Although far from the world of classical philosophy, Hochschild ends 
her appeal with a description as good as any of the kind of virtue that 
would "adom"330 the American regime: "Public opinion surveys have 
shown repeatedly that Americans want to be generous toward people 
in need; they want to be free from gender and racial discrimination; 
they want people to have jobs that support them and their 
324. Id. at 147 (citing data from BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COM-
MERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS (Washington, D.C. 1985)). 
325. Id. at 150. 
326. Id. 
327. Id. at 151. 
328. Id. 
329. Id. at 151-52 (footnotes omitted). 
330. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
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children. "331 
CONCLUSION 
As I write this conclusion, the shelves in my office at the law 
school are filled with the books I've been using - Nicomachean Eth-
ics, A Theory of Justice, Private Wealth and Public Education, Spheres 
of Justice, Be.longing to America. A couple of months ago, my dean 
wandered in, and, seeing me deep in a copy of Justice and the Human 
Good, he said (hope springing eternal in the decanal breast, no doubt), 
"I can't believe I even have to pay you to do such good stuff." 
The drawback, of course, is legalarboraphobia (fear of being a law 
review article falling in an empty forest). Yet even here, Aristotle has 
wisdom. In any society, the politically dominant class - the gov-
erning body - is the regime. These are the people "who 'rule' in a 
stronger or more precise sense than ordinary citizens and therefore 
require a training in prudence beyond what is available through the 
experience of ordinary political life."332 And in America, a century 
and a half of lawyers have had their heads swelled by Tocqueville's 
description of the regime: 
The government of democracy is favorable to the political power of law-
yers; for when the wealthy, the noble, and the prince are excluded from 
the government, the lawyers take possession of it, in their own right, as it 
were, since they are the only men of information and sagacity, beyond 
the sphere of the people, who can be the object of the popular choice.333 
But those of us whom the dean pays to educate the regime would do 
well to read on: 
I am not ignorant of the defects inherent in the character of this body of 
men; but without this admixture of lawyer-like sobriety with the demo-
cratic principle, I question whether democratic institutions could long be 
maintained; and I cannot believe that a republic could hope to exist at 
the present time if the influence of lawyers in public business did not 
increase in proportion to the power of the people. 334 
331. Hochschild, supra note 320, at 155. 
332. Lord, supra note 169, at 139. 
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